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THE FAILURE OF EDUCATION FEDERALISM
Kristi L. Bowman*
ABSTRACT
Since the Great Recession of 2007–09, states have devoted even less money to
public education and state courts have become even more hostile to structural re-
form litigation that has sought to challenge education funding and quality. Yet the
current model of education federalism (dual federalism) leaves these matters largely
to the states. As a result, state-level legislative inaction, executive acquiescence, and
judicial abdication can combine to create a situation in which the quality of tradi-
tional public schools declines sharply. This is the case in Michigan, which is an
unusually important state not only because the dynamics that are emerging in some
other states are mature in Michigan but also because Michigan is the home state of
Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, who has influenced the state’s education policy
substantially. Glaring gaps in educational quality like those in Michigan are not
the federal government’s problem, and in some ways the federal government’s hands
are tied when it comes to being part of the solution. This must change. Dual feder-
alism does not reflect the current reality of many federal-state-local relationships,
and it is sorely outdated in the context of public education. Accordingly, I argue for
a larger, though by no means exclusive, federal role in K-12 public education with
the goal of establishing a floor of educational quality for students across the coun-
try. In addition to proposing legislative and agency-based changes, I advance the
novel litigation strategy of pairing a minimal educational quality right via Sub-
stantive Due Process with rational basis with bite review under the Equal
Protection Clause. In these ways and others, we must move to a new model of
federalism in education—cooperative federalism. Without this shift, a floor of edu-
cational quality will continue to be uneven both among and within states, and in
more and more places like Michigan, the floor will rot and students will fall
through.
* Vice Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Michigan State University
College of Law. I appreciate the exceptional research assistance provided by MSU law
librarians Jane Meland, Daryl Thompson, and Barbara Bean, and MSU Law alumni Adrienne
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least, colleagues at MSU and across the country graciously provided thoughtful and insightful
comments on this article at various stages—thank you to David Arsen, Joyce Baugh, Scott
Bauries, Derek Black, Robert Garda, Jr., Mary Mason, Rachel Moran, Jason Nance, Eloise
Pasachoff, Sarah Reckhow, Aaron Saiger, and Michael Sant’Ambrogio.
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INTRODUCTION
Education federalism is failing our children. Especially since the
Great Recession, states have been increasingly unlikely to invest in
public schools and have been even less amenable to structural edu-
cation reform initiatives. In some states, the executive or judiciary
has attempted to counteract this trend. In a small but growing num-
ber of other states, checks and balances effectively no longer occur,
at least when it comes to financing public education. And because
of the relationship between the states and federal government re-
garding education, the federal government is largely unable to
intervene via statute, regulation, or court order.
The debates that emerge from this situation are not new: ques-
tions about federalism, courts’ ability to produce social change, and
the degree to which “money matters” in schools have all been at the
heart of American education law and policy for quite some time. In
one form or another, these themes are woven throughout more
than a half-century of vigorous discussions about education funding
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reform by judges, legislators, and researchers.1 In fact, from 1966—
when the Coleman Report,2 the fountainhead of modern education
research, was produced—through today, ample research has sought
to unpack the impact of funding. A new consensus may be emerg-
ing, documenting that court orders and legislative reforms that
result in increased school spending create short- and long-term
gains for students in the affected schools. This finding is especially
significant because it is unusual to identify a variable in a problem
as complex as educational quality and poverty that one can influ-
ence as easily as funding.
To be clear, influencing funding is theoretically simple but prac-
tically complex because school funding decisions are at the mercy
of political dynamics, and allocating more money for schools is
much like cutting a pie—a larger piece here means a smaller piece
elsewhere. That said, school funding debates are one way in which
abstract ideas about federalism and governance become concrete,
and this is where Part II of this Article begins. Because Part II pro-
vides the theoretical and practical context that anchors this Article,
in it I also summarize research about the importance of judicial and
legislative school finance decisions and discuss national trends in
school finance. Additionally, I discuss how the ideas of liberty and
equality manifest in school funding debates, and why it is important
to view liberty and equality not only as both necessary, but also as
mutually reinforcing, in the pursuit of educational quality.
Part III builds on that foundation, providing both the national
context for educational quality and funding battles and an in-depth
analysis of these same issues in one state: Michigan. The reasons for
focusing on Michigan are two-fold: First, the dynamics surrounding
public education appear to be changing in many states, as noted
above. In many parts of the country we may be seeing the emer-
gence of a new normal—and yet the dynamics that are new in some
1. See, e.g., Kristi L. Bowman, Pursuing Educational Opportunities for Latino/a Students, 88
N.C. L. REV. 911, 961–63, 962 n.267 (2010) (discussing the majority reasoning and political
posturing of Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009), which “weigh[ed] in” about whether
“money matters” in school reform); C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker Johnson & Claudia Persico,
The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance
Reforms, 131 Q.J. ECON. 157, 157–58 (2016); see also Christopher A. Suarez, Courthouse, State-
house, or Both? Redefining Institutional Roles in School Finance Reform, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 539
(2010) (discussing two recent books with different perspectives about courts’ ability to pro-
duce social change in the classroom).
2. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WEL-
FARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED01
2275.pdf; see also Eric A. Hanushek, What Matters for Student Achievement: Updating Coleman on
the Influence of Families and Schools, EDUCATIONNEXT, Spring 2016, at 19, http://educationnext
.org/files/ednext_XVI_2_hanushek.pdf (discussing the significance of the Coleman
Report).
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states are already mature in Michigan. Second, U.S. Secretary of
Education Betsy DeVos has had a significant impact on education
law and policy in her home state of Michigan,3 and it is not unusual
for federal education secretaries to draw inspiration from their
home states when setting a federal education agenda and incen-
tivizing state-level policies.4 Thus, for various reasons, studying
Michigan lets us understand a reality that may take root across the
country if significant federal protection of education rights remains
unavailable. As I discuss in Part III, in Michigan the interplay of
judicial abdication, legislative inertia, and executive acquiescence
over several decades produced a system in which the education
available in many school districts across the states is embarrassingly
inadequate. However, this situation has given rise to some of the
most creative education reform litigation our country has seen in
years, including the 2012–15 “right to read” litigation in Michigan
state court and the “right to literacy” case filed in late 2016 in fed-
eral court in Michigan.
Bearing in mind Michigan’s cautionary tale of public education,
in Part IV, I join others in arguing for a larger (though by no means
exclusive) federal role in K-12 public education with to increase ed-
ucational quality for students across the country.5 Specifically, I
consider roles that all three branches of the federal government
could play—from funding conditions Congress could impose, to
enforcement actions the Department of Education could pursue, to
ways in which federal interpretations of constitutional claims could
evolve. With regard to the latter, I contend that pairing a minimal
quality right via Substantive Due Process with “rational basis with
3. See, e.g., William Brangham, What Will Betsy DeVos’s Focus on School Choice Mean for
Public Education?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Jan. 17, 2017, 6:40 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/will-betsy-devos-focus-school-choice-mean-public-education/; Douglas N. Harris, DeVos
and the Education from Michigan, EDUC. NEXT (Dec. 5, 2016), http://educationnext.org/devos-
and-the-evidence-from-michigan/; Rebecca Mead, Betsy DeVos And The Plan to Break Public
Schools, NEW YORKER (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/
betsy-devos-and-the-plan-to-break-public-schools; What You Need to Know About Betsy DeVos,
DET. FREE PRESS (Jan. 18, 2017, 5:04 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/education/
2017/01/18/betsy-devos-charter-schools/96718680/ (collecting Free Press articles about
DeVos’s influence in Michigan education policy).
4. See, e.g., Julianne Hing, The School Reform Showdown in the Chicago Arne Duncan Left
Behind, COLOR LINES (Sept. 14, 2012, 9:37 AM), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/school-
reform-showdown-chicago-arne-duncan-left-behind (discussing how a previous Secretary of
Education, Arne Duncan, drew inspiration from his home state of Illinois).
5. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 WASH. U. L.
REV. 959, 963 (2015) (arguing that a greater federal role in education is necessary to increase
educational quality); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287 (2013) (making a similar argument).
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bite review” under the Equal Protection Clause would reunite lib-
erty and equality claims in the pursuit of education rights.
In sum, we must move to a new model of federalism in educa-
tion—cooperative federalism. Without this shift, a floor of
educational quality will continue to be uneven both among and
within states, and in more and more places like Michigan the floor
will rot and students will fall through.
I. PUBLIC EDUCATION’S RECIPE FOR DISASTER
Discussions about educational quality always come back to fund-
ing, and so that is where this Article begins. As with many things,
“who decides” is crucial in school finance, and thus that is the focus
of the first part of this Section, which discusses both the authority
over school funding decisions (state or federal), and the specific
structural location of various aspects of state power (in which
branch of government different decisions are made). The second
part provides a brief discussion of the significance of school finance
legislation and litigation, and the reality of school funding trends
across the country today. The third part discusses the role of the
ideas of liberty and equality in education reform debates and ex-
plains why we must view these ideas as mutually reinforcing and not
competing going forward.
A. Education Federalism
There are many models of federalism,6 and law professor
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson’s work deserves acclaim for focusing
our attention on the specific model of federalism employed vis-à-vis
public education. In various pieces, Robinson has analyzed both Su-
preme Court decisions and Congressional action to conclude that
the federal government takes a dual federalism approach regarding
public education—specifically, the federal government’s role is
quite limited, and state and local authority is much more powerful.
A central disadvantage of this approach is the inequality that is al-
lowed to exist both within and among states in the name of local
control, so much so that one cannot help but conclude from Robin-
son’s work that this inequality is a defining feature of the current
6. See Heather Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 63 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549 (2012) (arguing
that there are several theories of federalism); see also Robinson, Disrupting Education Federal-
ism, supra note 5, at 967 (applying Gerkin’s thesis to educational federalism).
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model of education federalism.7 Interestingly, there are at least two
ways in which the country has changed yet education federalism has
not kept pace: first, local school districts’ control over key matters
has been steadily declining for at least forty years,8 and second, in
Robinson’s words, “since the New Deal, the nation has moved to
the increasing jurisdictional partnerships that are oftentimes la-
beled cooperative federalism.”9
Cooperative federalism, in the words of scholars Erwin Chemer-
insky and Sam Kamin and attorneys Jolene Forman and Allen
Hopper, “allows federal and state laws to solve problems jointly
rather than conflict with each other. In the interest of cooperation,
certain federal statutes permit cooperative agreements between the
federal government and the states to solve issues of mutual con-
cern.”10 In cooperative federalism, federal power is not and need
not be plenary.11 The authors identify the Clean Air Act,12 the Clean
Water Act,13 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act14
as examples employing this approach of creating a federal substan-
tive floor and permitting states to opt out of a federal plan if they
adopt an approach that satisfies the regulations of the governing
federal agency.15 This approach is not radically different in concept
from the dual federalism approach currently in place with regard to
public education—it is merely a different point on the contin-
uum—but moving to this point is important. Although some
notable changes have reduced funding disparities and raised over-
all funding levels, then-law professor, now-California Supreme
Court Justice Goodwin Liu and others have documented that fund-
ing disparities within and, even more, among states remain
7. See Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 287–88, 293–314.
8. See id. at 312; see also Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56
EMORY L.J. 125, 130–32 (2006) (arguing that local control over education policy is an
illusion).
9. Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, supra note 5 at 292.
10. Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 74, 116 (2015).
11. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 404
(2006).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7401–02 (2012); see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 10, at 117 n.165.
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012); see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 10, at 117 n.166.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18041–42 (2012); see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 10, at 118.
15. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 10, at 117–18.
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substantial despite decades of legislative and litigation reform ef-
forts.16 Indeed, the U.S. remains an outlier among developed
nations in this regard.17
Who is to say that a more extensive federal role is a better option,
though? Not everyone thinks it would be, in part because the fed-
eral government has a mixed record on education reform issues
and some would characterize in even less favorable terms.18 As one
scholar notes, “[u]nless state courts prove themselves unwilling and
unable to deal with the structural problems created by educational
policies, the federal government should assume a role that leaves
sufficient space for state courts to operate.”19 So, are state govern-
ments willing and able to perform these functions?20
B. Constricting State Resources
Each branch of state government plays a role in school finance.
The executive branch is involved through the state’s department of
education and on occasion through the advocacy of the state’s gov-
ernor and the attorney general.21 The state legislature determines
the amount of the state per pupil grant and the amount of supple-
mental funding available to districts.22 (On average, state funding
comprises slightly less than half of a school district’s budget, and
sometimes the budget is not finalized until school districts have al-
ready started a new fiscal year.23) The judiciary functions as a check
16. Liu, supra note 11, 332–33 (2006); see also BRUCE BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAW CTR., IS
SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD (3rd ed. 2014), http://www.edlawcenter
.org/assets/files/pdfs/publications/National_Report_Card_2014.pdf (education funding in-
equities from state to state); COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REMEDIAL EDUCATION: FEDERAL
EDUCATION POLICY 8 (2016), https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/book_pdf/RA-Remedi-
alEducation.pdf; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A STRATEGY FOR
EDUCATION EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 14, 17–20 (2013), https://www2.ed.gov/about/bd-
scomm/list/eec/equity-excellence-commission-report.pdf; Robinson, Disrupting Education
Federalism, supra note 5, at 973 (describing school funding inquiries).
17. Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 980; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE
COMM’N, supra note 16, at 15.
18. See Aaron Lawson, Educational Federalism: A New Case for Reduced Federal Involvement in
K-12 Education, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 281, 302 (2013).
19. Id. at 286.
20. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Charles Barone, and Elizabeth DeBray all answer this
question in the negative. Charles Barone and Katherine DeBray, Education Policy in Congress:
Perspectives from Inside and Out, in CARROTS, STICKS, AND THE BULLY PULPIT (Frederick M. Hess
& Andrew P. Kelly, eds., 2011); Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 1005
(quoting Barone and Debray).
21. See infra Part III(B)(2).
22. See FAITH E. CRAMPTON, DAVID C. THOMPSON, AND R. CRAIG WOOD, MONEY AND
SCHOOLS 51–53 (6th ed. 2015) (describing how states finance education).
23. Id. at 56–57.
8 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 51:1
on the legislature and the executive by hearing state constitutional
claims of funding inequality and insufficiency.24 These claims are
generally based on two types of provisions—those that establish a
positive right to education and those that guarantee equal protec-
tion of the laws more generally.25 Although some have divided
school finance litigation into phases described by a focus on ade-
quacy of funds provided or equity of opportunities available, the
reality of the claims is more complex than that.26 In total, forty-four
states across the country have experienced state-law-based school fi-
nance litigation.27
The results of plaintiffs’ victories in school finance litigation over
time have been said to be both symbolically significant and mod-
est.28 Specifically, these results have been understood to be
significant because the majority of school finance victories for plain-
tiffs impose a quality or equity standard including specific
obligations.29 But they have also been viewed as modest, as law pro-
fessor Scott Bauries’ work has articulated, in part because of the
conflation between the violation of the right (occurring in the
past), and the creation of a remedy (looking towards the future).30
The modesty grows when we realize that courts in Florida, Illinois,
Louisiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island have de-
clined to review legislative decisions about school finance, citing
concerns about separation of powers, justiciability, and other
issues.31
24. Id at 57–68, 86–101.
25. Id.
26. See James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1223, 1229–30 (2008).
27. SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, http://schoolfunding.info/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (show-
ing six states, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah, that have not had
important education-finance litigation court decisions); see also Derek W. Black, Unlocking the
Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step Toward Education as a Federally
Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1360–73 (2010) (recounting successes and fail-
ures of school finance cases in state courts).
28. See, e.g., Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 979–80.
29. See Michael Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role
of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1500–11 (2007).
30. Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education, 48 GA. L.
REV. 949, 967–74 (2014); see also Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial
Review of Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV.
701 (2010); Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher Shortages, and the
Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 423, 459–62 (2016) (discussing
recognition and enforcement of rights to education).
31. See Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 315 (discussing
the Florida, Illinois, Michigan, and Rhode Island courts’ reactions); Lawson, supra note 18, at
314 n.166 (citing the Louisiana and Pennsylvania courts’ reactions); see infra Part III(A)(2)
(discussing the Michigan court’s reactions in Milliken v. Green (Governor I), 203 N.W.2d 457
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That said, scholars are increasingly coming to understand that
the impact of these state-level decisions can be far reaching. In
2016, University of California-Berkley and Northwestern University
economists Julien Lafortune, Jesse Rothstein, and Diane Whitmore
Schanzenback concluded:
[W]e find that reform events—court orders and legislative re-
forms —lead to sharp, immediate, and sustained increases in
mean school spending and in relative spending in low-income
school districts. Using representative samples from the Na-
tional Assessment of Educational Progress, we also find that
reforms cause gradual increases in the relative achievement of
students in low-income school districts, consistent with the
goal of improving educational opportunity for these stu-
dents. . . . Finance reforms are arguably the most important policy for
promoting equality of educational opportunity since the turn away
from school desegregation in the 1980s.32
Two years earlier, in 2014, economists C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker
Johnson, and graduate student Claudia Persico, also from North-
western University and the University of California-Berkley,
similarly determined:
Consistent with prior research, we find that court-mandated re-
forms were effective at reducing spending inequality between high-
and low-income districts within a state and that this was
achieved by increasing spending for the lowest-income dis-
tricts. . . . Looking to legislative reforms, our findings differ
from many others in that we find that legislative reforms were
somewhat effective at reducing spending gaps. . . . Event-study and
instrumental variable models reveal that a 20 percent increase
in per-pupil spending each year for all 12 years of public
school for children from poor families [born between 1955
and 1985] leads to about 0.9 more completed years of educa-
tion, 25 percent higher earnings, and a 20 percentage-point
reduction in the annual incidence of adult poverty; we find no
effects for children from non-poor families. The magnitudes of
these effects are sufficiently large to eliminate between two-thirds and
(Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973), and Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974)).
32. Julien Lafortune, Jesse Rothstein & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, School Finance
Reform and the Distribution of Student Achievement 1, 3 (Northwestern Inst. for Policy Research,
Working Paper No. WP-16-04, 2016), https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/publications/docs/
workingpapers/2016/WP-16-04.pdf (emphasis added).
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all of the gaps in these adult outcomes between those raised in poor
families and those raised in non-poor families.33
These findings are consistent with earlier work and analysis by
leading school finance expert Michael Rebell and others conclud-
ing that: first, decisions by courts and legislatures are critically
important in equalizing school funding, and second, that school
funding increases are especially significant if education is to be any-
thing close to a great equalizer.34 Ideally, state legislatures would
fund schools at a level that is both adequate and equitable, but in at
least thirty states, total funding for public schools was less in FY
2014 than prior to the recession in FY 2008.35 Furthermore, a 2016
report by the Education Law Center documents that states continue
to vary radically in their level of funding fairness within the state.36
For most of the past fifty years, state courts have been the place
to challenge these legislative decisions that have contributed to ed-
ucational disparities, but that does not mean this option remains
even as modestly effective as it has been in the past. Indeed, every
state has a constitutional provision guaranteeing some sort of right
to free public elementary and secondary education. However, in
law professor Derek Black’s words:
Since the recession, courts have rejected school funding and
quality challenges at a far higher rate [than they had previ-
ously]. Even in those instances in which plaintiffs have won
since the recession, legislatures have simply defied the courts,
refusing to comply with judicial remedies. Thus, even when
33. C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker Johnson & Claudia Persico, The Effect of School Finance
Reforms on the Distribution of Spending, Academic Achievement, and Adult Outcomes i, 43 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 20118, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w20118.pdf (emphasis added).
34. See generally BRUCE BAKER, ALBERT SHANKER INST., DOES MONEY MATTER IN EDUCA-
TION? 3–6 (2d ed. 2016), http://www.shankerinstitute.org/sites/shanker/files/moneymat
ters_edition2.pdf; REBELL, supra note 1; Rob Greenwald et al., The Effect of School Resources on
Student Achievement, 66 REV. EDUC. RES. 361, 362, 368 (1996); Robinson, The High Cost of Edu-
cation Federalism, supra note 5, at 317–18 (summarizing research).
35. MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET POLICY AND PRIORITIES, MOST STATES
HAVE CUT SCHOOL FUNDING, AND SOME CONTINUE CUTTING 1 (2016), https://www.cbpp.org/
research/state-budget-and-tax/most-states-have-cut-school-funding-and-some-continue-
cutting.
36. BRUCE BAKER ET AL., RUTGERS EDUC. LAW CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL
REPORT CARD 2–11 (5th ed. 2016), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxtYmwryVI00WGEx
T3EtVGhDclE/view; see also Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, supra note 5, at
320 (discussing the 2012 report).
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plaintiffs have received favorable judicial opinions, they have
struggled to secure victory outside court.37
Since 2016 when Black’s article was published, the Kansas Supreme
Court struck down the legislature’s public education finance
scheme, and the Kansas decision may fit within the trend Black
identifies.38 Thus, it is not only state legislatures but also state courts
across the country that appear to be increasingly amenable to a
skin-and-bones night watchman state in public education.39 It is ex-
actly that sort of minimal government that can exacerbate
inequality in countless ways.
Although this is a new dynamic in many states, at least one
state—Michigan—has a longer history of judicial abdication
dovetailing with legislative inertia and executive inaction regarding
school funding and educational quality. The result, as Education
Trust reported in 2016, is a “systemic failure . . . [in which] Michi-
gan ranks an abysmal 42nd of 47 states in the fairness of its funding
system.”40 Furthermore, student achievement in Michigan, regard-
less of race, ethnicity, poverty and wealth, “in early reading and
middle school math [is] not keeping up with the rest of the U.S.,
much less . . . international competitors.”41 It is tempting to view the
situation in Michigan as idiosyncratic, but doing so would be a mis-
take. Rather, we should view Michigan as the canary in the coal
mine showing us how far a state judiciary can go to avoid engaging
the merits of educational quality claims and what can happen when
all three branches of government endorse or acquiesce in the “new
minimal state”42 approach to public education.
37. Black, Averting Educational Crisis, supra note 30, at 427; see also Madeline Davis, Com-
ment, Off the Constitutional Map: Breaking the Endless Cycle of School Finance Litigation, 2016
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 117, 118 (2016) (referencing the fact that there is a tension between the
courts and the legislature, with the legislature failing to follow through with court orders).
38. Black, Averting Educational Crisis, supra note 30, at 456–57; see also Rebell, supra note
29, at 1500–05. For more on the epic school finance litigation battle in Kansas, see Richard E.
Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School Finance Litiga-
tion, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021 (2006).
39. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1181
(2014). Kansas may continue to be an interesting exception. See, e.g., Hunter Woodall, Fi-
nance Legislation Passes, Keeping Kansas Schools Open, KANSAS CITY STAR (June 24, 2016, 11:30
AM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/state/kansas/article85773397.html.
40. AMBER ARELLANO, SUNEET BEDI AND TERRY GALLAGHER, EDUC. TRUST-MIDWEST, MICHI-
GAN’S TALENT CRISIS: THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR REBUILDING MICHIGAN’S BROKEN PUBLIC
EDUCATION SYSTEM 8, 21 (2016), https://midwest.edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/
2013/10/MIAchieves2016_5-15-16WEB.pdf.
41. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
42. Anderson, supra note 39.
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C. Liberty and Equality in Education
Liberty and equality are complex concepts with multiple mean-
ings. Countless scholars have written about both ideas, stretching
back to Plato and Aristotle.43 The goal of this subsection is to pro-
vide a brief overview of both concepts and to connect them to
education reform litigation. Like the concept of education federal-
ism and the ideas of constricting state resources and importance of
school finance reform and litigation, liberty and equality form part
of the conceptual foundation of this Article and, accordingly, are
themes that run throughout it.
At a general level, liberty is commonly understood to mean “free-
dom from coercion.”44 It has both negative aspects (freedom from)
and positive aspects (freedom to). In the context of education law,
students’ First Amendment free speech rights are a classic example
of negative liberty claims—individual speakers have freedom from
interference by the school when they seek to express their ideas,
although the freedom is not without limitation.45 Positive aspects of
liberty claims, on the other hand, focus on an individual’s freedom
to make meaningful choices about his or her own life—impor-
tantly, this is not merely freedom in a formal sense (what the rules
say) but also freedom in a substantive sense (what a person’s actual
options are in significant situations).46 In this respect, an affirmative
right to a quality education, for example, is grounded in the idea of
liberty because its goal is to empower a person to have meaningful
choices about the direction of his or her life. At the state level, lan-
guage in each state’s constitution creates a right to education and
thus theoretically establishes this individual liberty. In the absence
of explicit constitutional language about education at the federal
level, positive liberty presents itself as an implied fundamental right
derived from explicit fundamental rights and also via substantive
due process.
Equality is no less complicated than liberty. At its core, it focuses
on sameness, but sameness of what—of inputs or outcomes? Should
43. See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1969) (discussing the many interpretations of the concepts of freedom
and liberty); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607, 629–37 (1996) (explaining American conceptions of liberty and equality).
44. Kornhauser, supra note 43, at 629.
45. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
46. See Kornhauser, supra note 43, at 630–31; see also Berlin, supra note 43, at 131–34
(explaining the notion of positive freedom).
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shares be distributed per capita or proportionally and if propor-
tional then based on what criteria or principles? Should this be
measured at the level of the individual or a group?47 In the context
of educational rights, equality claims have presented themselves
most often in the context of racial and ethnic discrimination claims
in federal courts, and school funding disparity and insufficiency
claims in state courts. In both of these areas of litigation, the focus
has been on treating groups the same rather than individuals. In
school desegregation, the question has been whether some chil-
dren were provided different educational opportunities based on
their race or ethnicity and, if so, whether such a distinction survived
strict scrutiny.48 In school finance, the cases in the 1970s began by
focusing on equality of inputs in districts within the same state and
evolved to a more nuanced approach of also considering whether
the funding enabled districts to provide a constitutionally adequate
level of education.49 Thus, at a very general level, school funding
cases have focused both on school-level inputs and outcomes, with
the connection to student-level outcomes more attenuated.
These days, liberty and equality claims are often viewed as con-
flicting, although the extent of a conflict is in part dependent on
how one defines both liberty  and equality.50 In the context of pub-
lic education, though, liberty and equality are not assumed to
conflict as much as they simply seem unrelated. However, when we
present the question of the concepts’ relationship in the context of
47. Kornhauser, supra note 43, at 632 (“Equality has a multitude of meanings including
equality of opportunity, of results, of resources, of needs satisfaction, of utility; individual or
group equality.”). See generally ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. 3, ch. 3 ( T.A. Sinclair trans.,
Penguin Books 1981); PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO, bk. 6, ch. 757 (Thomas L. Pangle trans.,
1980); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald
Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., 283 (1981); Ron-
ald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1987); Ronald
Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1987).
48. For an overview of some of the most significant school desegregation and integra-
tion cases, see THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC EQUALITY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
Mendez, Brown, and Beyond (Kristi L. Bowman ed., 2015).
49. Kristi L. Bowman, A New Strategy for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equality in Public
Schools, 1 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 47, 57–58 (2009) (describing the various waves of
reform in school finance legislation).
50. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Liberty and Equality, in RONALD DWORKIN 82 (Arthur Rip-
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educational quality, the connection and indeed the mutually rein-
forcing nature of the relationship both become clear.51 Each
student must receive an education of a certain level of quality if she
or he is to be able to exercise his or her constitutional rights and to
have the real (not merely theoretical) freedom to make choices
about the direction of her or his life.52 Educational quality often
varies radically between neighboring school districts. While this is
due in part to factors external to the school system, there is no
doubt that substantial disparities exist when one compares neigh-
boring districts’ resources and educational quality.53 That
conclusion is the natural result of considering equality on a per-
capita basis, but disparities are even greater if one considers equal-
ity on a needs basis (which, in fact, is how cost studies are done
across the nation when assessing the sufficiency of school fund-
ing).54 Finally, it bears noting that the boundaries dividing
neighboring districts such as Detroit and Grosse Point, Michigan,
for example, are lines of demarcation on the basis of wealth and
also race and ethnicity, although school districts are not legally lia-
ble for de facto school segregation caused by residential racial and
ethnic isolation within their boundaries or for racial or ethnic isola-
tion across district lines.55
51. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 n.14
(2011) (chronicling many of the key articles discussing the relationship between liberty and
equality).
52. See generally AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987).
53. See, e.g., Cory Turner, The 50 Most Segregating School Borders in America, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO: EDUC. (Aug. 23, 2016, 6:17 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/08/23/
490513305/the-50-most-segregating-school-borders-in-america (discussing the difference be-
tween the Detroit and Grosse Pointe School Districts in Michigan); Cory Turner, Why
America’s Public Schools Have a Money Problem, NAT’L PUB. RADIO MORNING EDITION (Apr. 18,
2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/18/474256366/why-americas-schools-have-a-
money-problem (discussing the difference between Chicago and its suburbs); see also
EDBUILD, https://edbuild.org/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (a nonprofit organization dedi-
cated to more equitable school funding with several interactive features on its website).
54. A recent costing-out study was performed for Michigan public schools. AUGENBLICK,
PALAICH & ASSOCIATES, MICHIGAN EDUCATION FINANCE STUDY (2016), https://www.michigan
.gov/documents/budget/Michigan_Education_Finance_Study_527806_7.pdf. Regarding
weighting the funding, the study notes “[t]he study team recommends that funding from
state and local sources be available for at-risk and ELL students equivalent to weights of 0.30
for at-risk students and 0.40 for ELL students.” Id. at xi.
55. See, e.g., Charles Clotfelter, Milliken and the Prospects for Racial Diversity in U.S. Public
Schools, in THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC EQUALITY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra,
note 48; Barbara Shircliffe, The Racialization of Space in Urban America, H-NET REVIEWS (2004),
https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=9951 (reviewing KEVIN FOX GOTHAM, RACE,
REAL ESTATE, AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE KANSAS CITY EXPERIENCE (2002)); Turner, The
50 Most Segregating School Borders in America, supra note 53.
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II. THE ROTTING FLOOR OF EDUCATIONAL QUALITY
The model of federalism employed in K–12 education, dual fed-
eralism, gives substantial deference to state-level legislative,
executive, and judicial decisions—especially regarding educational
quality and school funding. Under this approach, variation among
states is not only expected but, in fact, is encouraged. The under-
belly of this deference and variation is that the proverbial floor of
educational quality is uneven between states. Furthermore, we
often seem to assume that although educational disparities exist
among districts and states, the gaps have become smaller over time
and in general the system of checks and balances at the state level is
working as it should.56 Unfortunately, this is not the case. In some
states, school finance reforms have not gained traction in any
branch of state government and, in fact, may be in retrograde.
Layer on top of this the disconnect between educational liberty
claims and educational equality claims, and it should be no surprise
that the evenness and stability of the floor of educational quality
across the country have been seriously overestimated.
As law professor Kimberly Jenkins Robinson writes, the costs of a
lack of quality are enormous, not only to those individuals who are
denied an adequate education, but also to the broader society of
which they are a part:
[I]ncreasing the high school graduation rate could save the
nation between $7.9 and $10.8 billion annually in food stamps,
housing assistance and welfare assistance. The nation forfeits
$156 billion in income and tax revenues during the life span
of each annual cohort of students who do not graduate from
high school. This cohort also costs the public $23 billion in
health care costs and $110 billion in diminished health quality
and longevity. By increasing the high school graduation rate
by one percent for men aged twenty to sixty, the nation could
save $1.4 billion each year from reduced criminal behavior.
Given this research, ineffective schools inflict high costs upon
the nation—costs that it cannot afford as it wrestles with pre-
dicted long-term growth in the deficit and significant, yet
declining, unemployment.57
To illustrate both how and why these results can occur, this sec-
tion discusses the national context and trends in school finance
56. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 18.
57. Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 974 (citations omitted).
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while also providing depth by analyzing the situation in Michigan as
an example of the danger of the current model of education feder-
alism. The section begins with a brief discussion of states’
constitutional provisions regarding education and related litigation,
including an unusual case in which the Michigan Supreme Court
issued two decisions in rapid order—the second reversing the first
soon after an election changed the membership of the court. Then,
this section turns to school finance schemes, comparing and con-
trasting the approach that has been in place in Michigan for the
past two decades with the approaches taken in other states. This
discussion also includes an analysis of some of the inequities that
can come to pass when school finance interacts with other state ed-
ucation policies, including school choice. Finally, this section
analyzes unique education reform litigation that emerged as an al-
ternative, but still ultimately unsuccessful, way to conceive of a right
to education in state court, Michigan’s 2012–15 “right to read”
lawsuit.
This Section thus demonstrates the effects of constricting re-
sources and provides an example of the way in which liberty and
equality claims form a double helix in education reform litigation.
Ultimately, the situation in Michigan—and its proximity to or fore-
shadowing of the situation in other states—makes the case that
education federalism has failed to produce widespread educational
quality, and that a greater federal role is necessary.
A. Judicial Abdication and Executive Politics
In the vast majority of the forty-four states where school finance
litigation has taken place, courts have genuinely grappled with the
issues raised by the plaintiffs. In about a half-dozen states, however,
courts have declined to review legislative decisions about school fi-
nance—and these states’ constitutional language about education
varies substantially. The express reasons why state courts go to great
lengths to avoid school finance issues likely vary significantly from
one state to another and the implicit, political reasons may be even
more state-specific than that.58
58. See Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?, supra note 30 (discussing the variations
of state constitutional provisions in terms of separation of powers and how that impacts state
courts decisions in educational adequacy cases); Lawson, supra note 18, at 314 n.166 (provid-
ing other examples of the variety of approaches state courts take when interpreting
constitutional provisions); Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 315
(“[M]any plaintiffs have found the state courthouse doors closed to them by courts who
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To demonstrate the complex interaction of the express and im-
plicit reasons that lead a state to abdicate its responsibility to fund
schools fairly, this section analyzes the course of events in Michigan
in the context of national trends. After discussing the relevant con-
stitutional language in Michigan, this Article analyzes the litigation
that followed, focusing in Michigan on the Governor litigation in the
early 1970s.59 The conventional wisdom that Michigan’s right to ed-
ucation is a mere access right is, first, built on a very shaky
foundation and, second, the result of judicial abdication and execu-
tive politics. Unfortunately for the children of Michigan, without
access to federal courts or support from the federal legislative or
executive branch, the conventional wisdom has become the reality.
1. State Constitutional Provisions
The 1950s and 60s were a time of significant cultural and legal
change in the United States, and education reform was a key aspect
of the change. At the national level, the Civil Rights Movement
gained momentum, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954, and southern legislators’ resistance throughout
the Southern Manifesto and citizens’ resistance through violence
and other means echoed throughout the country.60 At the state
level, during the 1950s and 60s (and a few years on either side of
these decades), a full quarter of the states revised their state consti-
tutions.61 Michigan was one of these states, enacting its current
constitution in 1963.
As in many states, the history of education rights in Michigan is a
long one. Interestingly, federal support for public education in
Michigan predates even statehood—it can be traced back to the
Confederation Congress’s Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which also
applied to land that would become Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wiscon-
sin, and Minnesota.62 Building on the foundation of the Northwest
viewed the determination of school finance systems to be the sole discretion of state
legislatures.”).
59. The term “Governor litigation” refers to two decisions by the Michigan Supreme
Court in the important school finance litigation case involving Michigan Governor William
Milliken: Milliken v. Green (Governor I), 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d
711 (Mich. 1973), and Milliken v. Green (Governor II), 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973).
60. See generally THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC EQUALITY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, supra note 48, at 57–170.
61. Citizens Research Council of Mich., A Brief Michigan Constitutional History, CRC MEM-
ORANDUM, Jan. 2015, at 1, http://crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2010/rpt36002.pdf.
62. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States, North-West
of the River Ohio, art. 3 (July 13, 1787) (“Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary
to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education
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Ordinance, when Michigan became a state in 1837, its admission to
the union was conditioned on reserving land for public elementary
and secondary schools as well as universities.63 In fact, between the
1803 admission of Ohio and the 1959 admission of Alaska, the fed-
eral land grant program created dedicated space for public
elementary and secondary schools in nearly all of the thirty-two
states that joined the Union during that time.64
This history underscores federal support for public education
and forms part of the context for states’ constitutional language re-
garding public schools. Again like many states, Michigan’s earlier
constitutions (those enacted in 1835, 1850, and 1908) all provided
for a system of public elementary and secondary schools.65 In 1963,
Michigan voters approved the state’s current constitution, includ-
ing more extensive provisions regarding education.66 These
shall forever be encouraged.”); Milliken v. Green (Governor I), 203 N.W. 2d 457, 477 (Mich.
1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973).
63. Johnson I, 203 N.W.2d at 477 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As a condition of becoming a
state, Congress required Michigan to assent to some requirements including “[t]hat section
numbered sixteen in every township of the public lands, and where such section has been
sold or otherwise disposed of, other lands equivalent thereto, and as contiguous as may be,
shall be granted to the State for the use of schools.” Act of June 23, 1836, ch. 121, 5 Stat. 59;
Assent of the State of Michigan to the Act of Congress of June 15, 1836, 1837 Mich. Rev. Stat.
31.
64. See CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE ORIGINAL FEDERAL LAND GRANT
PROGRAM, 21–26 (2011), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED518388.pdf (showing each
state’s entry into the Union and how it was granted land for education).
65. MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. X, § 23; MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 3; MICH.
CONST. of 1835, art. X, §§ 2–3; Johnson I, 203 N.W.2d at 477–78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Article VIII of the 1963 Michigan Constitution is devoted entirely to education. The
latter sections of the article focus on higher education, but the first two sections pertain to
elementary and secondary education. MICH. CONST. art. VIII. The provisions read:
§ 1 Encouragement of education.
Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happi-
ness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.
§ 2 Free public elementary and secondary schools; discrimination.
The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and
secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district shall provide for the educa-
tion of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national
origin.
No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit uti-
lized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly
or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-
elementary, elementary, or secondary school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemp-
tion or deductions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or
property shall be provided, directly or indirectly, to support the attendance of any
student or the employment of any person at any such nonpublic school or at any
location or institution where instruction is offered in whole or in part to such nonpub-
lic school students. The legislature may provide for the transportation of students to
and from any school.
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provisions contain purposive language and, arguably, due to a
greater level of detail than in other aspects of the constitution, also
establish education as a high priority for the state. Eight other state
supreme courts have concluded that state constitutional language
identical or very similar to Michigan’s creates substantive educa-
tional rights,67 despite the lack of an explicit quality provision.68
If one accepts a preference for determining the contours of a
right to education at the state level, one must accept radically differ-
ent state supreme courts’ interpretations of often very similar
provisions about education. Some variation is of course a natural
result of differences among states, and indeed it is not reasonable
to expect entirely consistent results. However, it is deeply problem-
atic if one state’s interpretation is so far out of line when compared
its sister states that the renegade state’s approach can be classified
as judicial abdication.69
2. School Finance Litigation: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
Following the adoption of Michigan’s current state constitution
in 1963, education reform litigation in Michigan reflected move-
ment on the national scene. The federal Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 opened
the door for the federal government to compel school desegrega-
tion, and by the late 1960s school desegregation was picking up
speed.70 Yet school finance litigation lagged behind.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, school finance litigation was in
its infancy. By 1972, courts across the country had issued decisions
Id.
67. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002); Rose v. Council
for Better Ed., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d
1353 (N.H. 1997); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995);
Abbeville Co. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S. Car. 1999); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150–51 (Tenn., 1993); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d
71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
68. LM v. State, 862 N.W.2d 246, 267–69 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (Shapiro, J. dissenting),
cert. denied, 869 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. 2015). Constitutional law scholar William Thro classifies
Michigan’s education provisions as robust. William E. Thro, A New Approach to State Constitu-
tional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL. 525, 539–40, 540 n.39 (1998). Scott
Bauries has determined that constitutional text is not correlated with educational adequacy
claims. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room? supra note 31, at 746.
69. See Thro, supra note 68, at 529–32.
70. Gary Orfield, Education and Civil Rights: Lessons of Six Decades and Challenges of a
Changed Society, in THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC EQUALITY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, supra, note 48.
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in only ten school finance cases.71 The first decision was issued in
1968 in Illinois,72 and what would become the famous Rodriguez v.
San Antonio Independent School District litigation was on its way from
Texas to the U.S. Supreme Court.73 In Michigan, Governor William
Milliken and Attorney General Frank Kelley were inspired by school
finance plaintiffs’ 1971 watershed victory via the California Su-
preme Court’s Serrano v. Priest decision and intrigued by the
political popularity of school finance reform efforts.74 Together,
Milliken and Kelley designed a plan in which the Michigan Attor-
ney General would sue the state treasurer and a group of wealthy
school districts on behalf of both of their offices. In the words of
Elwood Hain, a law professor who was co-counsel for intervenors in
the Michigan case Milliken v. Green (the Governor I litigation),75 the
case was “built upside down” because “[t]he two plaintiffs logically
should have been defendants.”76 Furthermore, as Hain argued con-
vincingly, both plaintiffs’ standing to bring suit was “tenuous.”77
Nevertheless, the case moved forward with astonishing speed and
the Michigan Supreme Court entered the realm of education re-
form litigation on December 29, 1972 when it struck down the
school finance system that had been in place when the litigation
began.78 Although Governor I was a very early decision in this type of
institutional reform litigation, the facts in the Michigan case told a
now-familiar story that has since been echoed in school finance
cases all across the country. The Governor I majority summarized the
disparities in Michigan school districts:
[A]mong approximately one eighth of Michigan School dis-
tricts, the 48 richest districts had at least 4 times or more the
property tax ability to support their students as 32 of the
71. See e.g. Milliken v. Green (Governor I ), 203 N.W. 2d 457, 476, 476 n.1 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (Mich. 1972) (listing similar actions in other state courts), vacated, 212 N.W.2d
711 (Mich. 1973). This decision is known as “Governor I ” and the subsequent decision vacat-
ing it is known as “Governor II,” in contrast to the well-known school desegregation litigation
proceeding at the same time and also bearing Governor Milliken’s name, Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974). See LM v. State, 862 N.W.2d 246, 261 n.11 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (using
the case names “Governor I ” and “Governor II ”), cert. denied, 869 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. 2015); E.
Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303, 304–05 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
72. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Id. at 484–85.
73. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev’d, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Governor I, 203 N.W.2d
at 476, 476 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Elwood Hain, Milliken v. Green: Breaking the Legislative
Deadlock, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 350, 351 (1974).
75. 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973).
76. Hain, supra note 74, at 352.
77. Id.
78. 203 N.W.2d at 474.
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poorest districts. . . . [A]mong approximately two-thirds of
Michigan school districts serving about two-thirds of Michigan
school children the property tax power favors the richer half
of the districts by a ratio of at least 3 to 2. . . . [T]he inequali-
ties between school districts in their ability to finance an
education for their school children are sufficiently common
and severe to conclude that even with the equalizing efforts of
the Michigan school aid formula, the inherent differences in
the property tax bases of the school districts prevent equal re-
sources for the education of Michigan school children in a
substantial number of school districts.79
In Governor I, the court analyzed alleged violations of state and fed-
eral Equal Protection Clauses. The Governor I court determined,
based on state constitutional language and the constitutional con-
vention, that education was a fundamental right.80 Combined with
the wealth-based classification, recognition of education as a funda-
mental right triggered strict scrutiny.81 The state’s compelling
interest asserted in this case, as in so many other school finance
cases, was local control—namely, the rate of local taxation.82 Be-
cause the state’s annual changes to equalization funding suggested
alternatives to the current system, the court determined that the
current system was not the only one able to preserve the state inter-
est of local control.83 The system failed strict scrutiny, and
furthermore, the court held that the “substantial inequalities” of
the system would fail even under rational basis review.84 However,
the victory was short-lived.
Unlike in Serrano and Rodriguez, in Governor I the justices’ internal
decision process was significantly influenced by judicial elections.
In short, correctly anticipating that the November 1972 elections
79. Id. at 463, 467 (majority opinion).
80. Id. at 469 (the Court quoted from the 1961 Michigan constitutional convention de-
bates, summarizing the 1963 constitution’s education provisions, and emphasizing the
provisions’ specificity in contrast to “[t]he majority of articles in the Constitution [which] are
devoted to the operation of general government.”).
81. Id. at 469–70.
82. Id. at 470.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 470–71. Finally, the court noted limitations of its opinion, the most important
being: absolute equality in funding is not required; local control of curricular and other
decisions is unaffected by the decision; the court assumes no direct relationship between a
district’s property wealth and its students’ educational achievement; and, flirting with moot-
ness, only the school funding system in place when the litigation started was analyzed, not the
rather different system in place when the litigation ended. Id. at 474. Because of this last
caveat, the decision did not alter the law on the books in 1972, but it created precedent that
was a substantial victory for the children of the state, nonetheless. Id.
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had shifted the majority, the court issued its 4-3 decision in Governor
I two days before the new justices took office.85 The two outgoing
justices were split between the majority and the dissent, but the two
incoming justices both aligned with the Governor I dissenters.86 In
January 1973, the new court lost no time granting rehearing.87
Roughly two months later, in March 1973, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.88
The facts in Rodriguez were similar to the facts in the Governor litiga-
tion. Both reflected norms in school finance across the country: vast
disparities in districts’ taxable property values resulted in substan-
tially different revenues among school districts in a system heavily
reliant on local property taxes.89 In Rodriguez, the Court applied the
federal Equal Protection Clause and held that strict scrutiny was not
triggered because no suspect class had been identified and students
had not been completely deprived of education. Furthermore, the
Court held that education was not a fundamental federal constitu-
tional right.90 The Court concluded that Texas’s system of financing
schools bore a rational relationship to the state’s legitimate interest
of providing all children with education while deferring to local
control and thus was constitutional.91 Not surprisingly, Rodriguez is
85. Id. at 474–75 (Brennan, J. addendum). The complete story is a bit more compli-
cated. In an addendum preceding his dissent in Governor I, Justice Thomas Brennan reported
that after the case was argued in early June 1972, he was assigned to draft the opinion by the
process of “blind rotation.” Id. at 475. Accordingly, he circulated a draft to his colleagues in
late July 1972, eventually receiving only one draft concurrence—leaving him two votes shy of
the three votes in addition to his own that he would need to secure a majority. Id. In Novem-
ber 1972, two supreme court justices were voted out of office as part of the state’s regular
judicial elections, although the membership of the court would not change until the new
year. Id. (It is uncertain to what extent the Governor litigation influenced the election, al-
though the elections were highly politicized—for example, one of the justices elected that
year created a new political party for the sole purpose of enabling him to be a candidate in
the state’s partisan supreme court elections after his own party refused to nominate him.
About six weeks after the election, in mid-December 1972, Justice G. Mennen Williams circu-
lated his own draft opinion in Governor I with an outcome reportedly contrary to Brennan’s
earlier draft. Id. Williams’ opinion secured the agreement of three of the other justices and
became the opinion in Governor I. Id.; see Elizabeth Wheat & Mark S. Hurwitz, The Politics of
Judicial Selection: The Case of the Michigan Supreme Court, JUDICATURE, Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 8 (pro-
viding the political context of the Michigan Supreme Court at the time of Governor I).
86. Hain, supra note 74, at 354.
87. Milliken v. Green (Governor II), 212 N.W.2d 711, 712 (Mich. 1973) (the rehearing
was granted on January 30, 1973).
88. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
89. See Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 309 (discussing
Rodriguez).
90. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29–39 (Was the class indigent students? Students who are
poorer than others? Students in poor districts?).
91. See id. at 44–55.
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perhaps best known for bringing an end to school finance litigation
in federal courts.92
Nationally, advocates refocused on state courts and legislatures.
Back in Michigan, the Governor litigation continued and at the end
of 1973 the state Supreme Court issued its decision in Governor II.
The entire opinion was a vague one-paragraph amended order dis-
missing the case and vacating Governor I on arguably unpersuasive
procedural grounds.93 The Governor I majority had—the Governor II
majority concluded—”improvidently granted” Governor Milliken’s
request that the litigation proceed on an expedited schedule. In
other words, according to the majority in Governor II, their prede-
cessors should not have heard argument in Governor I at all.94
Two justices wrote a lengthy concurring opinion which supplied
the only substantive discussion in the Governor II decision.95 The
concurrence effectively conducted a rational basis analysis,96 assum-
ing that the state’s constitutional obligation was to “maintain and
support a system of public schools that furnishes adequate educa-
tional services to all children.”97 Foreshadowing much of the school
finance litigation and related debate that would occur across the
country over the following decades, the concurrence considered
the relative merits of the theories presented by the parties about
how to measure educational opportunity, summarizing what they
viewed as the problems with each approach:
The reduction of the sum total output to the accomplishment
of the pupils on a few achievement tests would be grossly un-
just to both the educators and the pupils, for education must
extend far beyond the limits of verbal facility or mathematical
92. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 813 (5th ed.
2012); Bowman, A New Strategy for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equality in Public Schools, supra
note 49, at 57.
93. Milliken v. Green (Governor II), 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Hain, supra note 74,
at 359.
94. See Hain, supra note 74, at 359.
95. Governor II, 212 N.W.2d at 711–21 (Kavanagh and Levin JJ., concurring). In Governor
I, Kavanagh dissented from the Williams majority, Milliken v. Green, (Governor I) 203 N.W.2d
457, 488 (Mich. 1972) (Kavanagh, J. concurring) (concurring with dissent from Brennan, J.);
Levin did not take part in deciding Governor I because he did not join the court until January
1973. To make it even more confusing, two justices by the name of Thomas Kavanagh simul-
taneously served on the Michigan Supreme Court. They were not related to each other.
Thomas M. Kavanagh wrote the order in this case. Thomas G. Kavanagh co-authored the
concurrence. The concurrence disposed of the federal claims on the basis of Rodriguez. Gover-
nor II, 212 N.W.2d at 713–14 (Kavanagh and Levin JJ., concurring).
96. The concurrence noted that the State’s Equal Protection Clause focused on prohib-
iting “invidious discrimination,” not on guaranteeing absolute equality. Governor II, 212
N.W.2d at 715 (Kavanagh and Levin JJ., concurring).
97. Id. at 720.
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proficiency. With respect to the input received by a school, the
level of taxable resources within a district is only one of the
myriad inputs into an educational system.98
Furthermore, in a passage that seemed to anticipate Michigan’s re-
cent “right to read” litigation, the concurrence stipulated:
[I]t is important to note that we are not presented with a con-
crete claim by either individual students or by school districts
that they are suffering from particular specified educational
inadequacies because of deficiencies in the school financing
system. Such concrete claims, when and if raised, will stand or
fall on their own merits and not on account of anything we say
here.99
Interestingly, even though the Governor II majority did not engage
the merits of the case, Michigan courts and others, ever since, have
incorrectly stated that the right to education in Michigan is not a
fundamental right.100
Although the Governor litigation pitted the executive against the
legislature and judiciary, since Governor II, the three branches have
been aligned. In the early 1980s, twenty Michigan school districts
again sued the state and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the state, holding
that the question presented was essentially the same as in the Gover-
nor litigation.101 In 1985, long-serving and still-revered Michigan
Attorney General Frank Kelley—who, in his official capacity, had
been a plaintiff in Governor I—issued an Opinion Letter concluding
that school districts did not need to provide alternative education
for a student facing a long term suspension or expulsion because
“public education is not a fundamental right under either the
98. Id. at 716.
99. Id. at 713. Reflecting on the evidence presented by the parties, the two concurring
justices did find one point of commonality with the majority from Governor I: all agreed that
the parties to the litigation had not presented evidence that financial disparities led to educa-
tional disparities. Id. at 719; Governor I, 203 N.W.2d at 473.
100. See, e.g., LM v. State, 862 N.W.2d 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, 869 N.W.2d
273 (Mich. 2015); E. Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984);
Sutton v. Cadillac Area Pub. Sch, 323 N.W.2d 582 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). The error is not
uniform; in the legislation authorizing the recent costing-out study, the legislature referred
to the right to education.
101. E. Jackson Pub. Sch., 348 N.W.2d at 304. Thus, noting its agreement with the two
concurring justices in Governor II, the appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the state and closed the case. Id. at 305–06. Additionally, the appellate court
held that because school districts are “creations of the state,” the districts themselves have no
authority to contest the school finance framework created by state statute. Id. at 306–07.
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United States or Michigan Constitutions.”102 The Opinion Letter
significantly overstated the certainty of its conclusion, and yet that
letter is part of the conventional wisdom that there is no fundamen-
tal right to education under the state constitution.
B. Legislative Inertia and Executive Acquiescence
In any state, the lack of a meaningful judicial remedy would be a
theoretical but not practical concern if public education were deliv-
ered at an acceptable level of quality across the state; however,
educational inequality and lack of quality both run rampant
throughout the nation. For the past twenty years, Education Week has
generated what it describes as an annual “report card on the state
of education for the nation and states.”103 The key criteria are K-12
achievement, school finance (both spending patterns and equity),
and the positive impact of education on child and adult out-
comes.104 In January 2016, the nation on the whole earned a grade
of C: a C- for student achievement, a C for school finance, and a C+
for positive impact.105 Michigan ranked below average, earning an
overall grade of C-; just 16 states ranked lower.106 It earned a D on
achievement; eight states ranked lower.107 It earned a C on school
finance; twenty-five states ranked lower and two more were ex-
cluded from the analysis.108 It earned a C on positive impact;
sixteen states ranked lower.
102. Mich. Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter No. 6271 (Feb. 7, 1985). To support the statement
about the absence of a fundamental right to education in state law, the Opinion Letter relied
on Michigan appellate courts’ then-recent decisions in East Jackson Public Schools, discussed
above, and in Sutton. In Sutton, a state appellate court held that the state constitution’s educa-
tion provision did not require districts to provide resident students with free transportation
to and from school—the case did not engage fundamental finance or educational quality
issues. Sutton, 323 N.W.2d at 583–85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Bond v. Pub. Sch. of
Ann Arbor, 178 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1970)). The Attorney General’s Opinion Letter does not
mention the Governor litigation, but such an omission is in part understandable—it is not
clear what one should make of the court’s cryptic one-sentence reversal of Governor I.
103. Press Release, Educ. Week, Quality Counts Marks 20 Years: Report Explores New Di-
rections in Accountability (Jan. 26, 2016) http://www.edweek.org/media/qualitycounts2016
_release.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Grading Summary, EDUC. WEEK, http://www.edweek.org/media/grading-summary-
education-week-quality-counts-2016.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
106. Id.
107. K-12 Achievement, EDUC. WEEK, http://www.edweek.org/media/k12-achievement-ed-
ucation-week-quality-counts-2016.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
108. School Finance, EDUC. WEEK, http://www.edweek.org/media/school-finance-educa-
tion-week-quality-counts-2016.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). Hawaii and the District of
Columbia were excluded from the school finance evaluation because they are single-district
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This snapshot conveys two crucial pieces of contextual informa-
tion: first, many states struggle to provide a quality education,
including financing their public schools at a level that is both ade-
quate and equitable. Second, according to analysis by Education
Week, school finance is better in Michigan than in many other
states109—which is important because this subpart discusses the web
of state policies in Michigan that impact school funding and the
many fiscal crises that are the natural result of those policies.
1. The Policy Web
Each state has a set of interconnected policies enacted via stat-
utes that dictate or influence school funding. A state’s school
finance scheme is the most consistent piece in the web from one
state to another; although states make various choices about how to
fund schools and at what level, all states provide significant funding
for education. Additionally, states can choose to authorize many,
some, or no charter schools;110 to permit open enrollment across
district lines or not;111 to centralize financing of teachers’ pension
and legacy costs system or not;112 to subsidize capital improvements
or not.113 Although the contours of these policies and the relation-
ship among them will differ significantly from one state to another,
a consistent theme is that these legislative choices interact to impact
the health of a state’s public school system in significant ways. While
remaining mindful of the national context, this subpart explores
Michigan’s interconnected policy choices to illustrate many of the
roots of the educational crisis in Michigan and also the natural con-
sequences of a system of unusually permissive school choice.
The first piece is the state’s school finance scheme. From around
the time of the Governor litigation in the early 1970s through the
mid-1990s, Michigan had a school finance system that was heavily
jurisdictions, thus it is impossible to evaluate equity across school districts when the jurisdic-
tion has only one school district. Id.
109. Id. (ranking Michigan twenty-fourth out of forty-nine eligible states in school fi-
nances in 2016).
110. See CRAMPTON, WOOD & THOMPSON, supra note 22, at 39 (defining charter schools);
Charter Schools—Does the State Have a Charter School Law?, EDUC. COMMISSION ST. (Jan. 2016),
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2?rep=CS1501 (listing the states with charter
schools and relevant state law authorizations of charter schools).
111. Open Enrollment 50-State Report—All Data Points, EDUC. COMMISSION ST., http://
ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquest4e?rep=OE1605 (last updated Nov. 2016).
112. See infra notes 131–136.
113. See, e.g., CTR. FOR CITIES & SCH., UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, STATE FUNDING FOR K-12
SCHOOL FACILITIES: A SURVEY OF THE STATES (2014), http://citiesandschools.berkeley.edu/
reports/Vincent_2014_State_K12%20fac_funding_final.pdf.
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reliant on local property taxes, so much so that Michigan’s property
taxes were among the highest in the nation.114 Michigan made na-
tional headlines when, in 1994, it enacted its current school finance
system and lowered local property tax rates substantially.115 The
new system offset school districts’ reduction in local tax revenues by
significantly increasing state support via the state’s per-pupil foun-
dation grant, and supplementing this with equalization funding to
school districts that were especially property-poor.116 Soon after this
modified foundation grant system was implemented in 1994, the
amount of school funding received by Michigan’s most property-
poor districts increased noticeably.117 But, over time, several demo-
graphic and statutory changes combined to complicate this school
finance system, creating direct and substantial fiscal hardship for
districts across the state and contributing to a decline in the quality
of education provided to the many children who live and attend
school in those districts.118
The second piece of the web is state law regarding school choice.
Between 2002–03 and 2012–13, enrollment in Michigan’s tradi-
tional public schools dropped by more than 13%.119 In part this is
due to a decline in the state’s school-age population, some of which
is because Michigan, a former titan of industry, has been in an eco-
nomic nose dive and was the only state in the nation with a smaller
population in 2010 than in 2000.120 However, the other key variable
is that Michigan has some of the most permissive school choice stat-
utes in the country, an approach that Secretary of Education Betsy
114. William Celis III, Michigan Votes for Revolution in Financing Its Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/17/us/michigan-votes-for-revolution-in-
financing-its-public-schools.html. Not surprisingly, this caused significant dissatisfaction
among property-owning taxpayers and eventually prompted legislative reform. See DAVID AR-
SEN & DAVID N. PLANCK, EDUC. POLICY CTR. AT MICH. STATE UNIV., MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE
UNDER PROPOSAL A: STATE CONTROL, LOCAL CONSEQUENCES 3–5 (2003), http://educa-
tion.msu.edu/epc/forms/Arsen_et_al_2003_Proposal_A.pdf; id.
115. E.g. Celis, supra note 114.
116. ARSEN & PLANCK, supra note 114, at 7; Marya Sieminski, Michigan’s Constitutional Pro-
tection for Education: Legal Rights or Empty Promises, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1309, 1314–15, 1314 n.36
(1994).
117. ARSEN & PLANCK, supra note 114, at 9–11; Leslie Papke, The Effects of Changes in Michi-
gan’s School Finance System, 36 PUB. FIN. REV. 456, 456–57 (2008).
118. See generally Papke, supra note 117, at 456–57.
119. An examination of the NCES data reveals the following: In the 2012–13 school year,
Michigan’s student enrollment was 1,555,370. In the 2002–03 school year, Michigan’s total
student enrollment was 1,785,160. Common Core of Data, State Nonfiscal Public Elementary/
Secondary Education Survey Data, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/
stnfis.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (comparing the total students enrolled in each school
year’s respective data set).
120. Matt Pearce, Why Michigan Has Been Lurching from Crisis to Crisis, L.A. TIMES (May 4,
2016, 3:48 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-michigan-dysfunction-20160503-snap-
story.html.
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DeVos, a long-time Michigan philanthropist, has supported.121
Michigan’s school choice statutes enact two policies: charter
schools and open enrollment.
Michigan authorized charter schools in 1994 as part of the state-
wide school finance overhaul122 and created the state’s current
open enrollment policy (known as “schools of choice”) in 1996.123
Since that time, charter schools have grown rapidly across the coun-
try, and the growth has been especially significant in Michigan.124
By 2015–16, Michigan’s charter schools educated almost 10% of the
state’s children, compared to 5.1% of children nationally.125 Addi-
tionally, in 2015 Michigan had three of the eleven school districts
nationally with the highest percentage of students enrolled in char-
ter schools.126 Due to the lack of oversight and the permissive
nature of the charter school enabling statute, many of Michigan’s
charters are academically quite weak. Thus a significant number of
charters perform worse than the home schools the students leave to
attend them.127 Many Michiganders have taken advantage of the
state’s unusually permissive open-enrollment policy, as well; in
2015–16, 13% of Michigan public school students attended school
in a district other than the one in which they lived.128
As a result, enrollment levels at the district level can be quite
volatile from year to year, which is troubling for a district that is
121. Allie Gross, Betsy DeVos’s Accountability Problem, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/01/betsy-devoss-accountability-problem/
513047/; How Betsy DeVos and Her Money Has Shaped Education in Michigan, MLIVE (Nov. 29,
2016), http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/11/how_betsy_devos_has_shaped_edu.
html.
122. Dustin Dwyer, The Day Michigan Killed Public Schools (and Then Created the System That
We Have Today), MICH. PUB. RADIO: ST. OPPORTUNITY BLOG (June 9, 2014), http://stateofop-
portunity.michiganradio.org/post/day-michigan-killed-public-schools-and-then-created-
system-we-have-today.
123. 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 876.
124. See Black, Averting Educational Crisis, supra note 30, at 435; Julie Mack, 23% of Michi-
gan Public School Students Opt for School Choice, (Aug. 29, 2016, 9:11 AM), http://www.mlive.
com/news/index.ssf/2016/08/charters_schools_of_choice_enr.html; Kate Zernike, A Sea of
Charter Schools in Detroit Leaves Students Adrift, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/06/29/us/for-detroits-children-more-school-choice-but-not-better-schools.
html?_r=0.
125. Table 216.90 Public elementary and secondary charter schools and enrollment, by state, NAT’L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (Sept. 2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/
dt15_216.90.asp (September 2015); see also Zernike, supra note 124; Mack, supra note 124.
126. NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., A GROWING MOVEMENT: AMERICA’S LARGEST
CHARTER SCHOOL COMMUNITIES 3 (10th ed. 2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/11/enrollmentshare_web.pdf.
127. See generally SUNIL JOY & AMBER ARELLANO, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ALL: 2016: THE BRO-
KEN PROMISE OF MICHIGAN’S CHARTER SECTOR (2016), http://3revla28wgij23c9gkypof0d-
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/10/The-Education-Trust-Mid-
west_Accountability-for-All-2016_February-11-2016.pdf.
128. Mack, supra note 124.
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losing students because school funding in Michigan is unusually
centralized at the state level. When a student leaves a district,
roughly $7,500 of state per-pupil funding follows that student out of
that district, and often out of the traditional public school system
entirely.129 Thus, a major drop in enrollment district-wide can trig-
ger a sort of death spiral because school districts have substantial
fixed costs and cannot simply reduce their expenditures in propor-
tion to the number of students they lose. Yet, school districts with
precipitously declining enrollments (and thus falling revenue)
must close schools and cut services for the students who remain,
even though doing so often encourages those students to consider
leaving, as well.130
The third piece in the web, the state teachers’ pension system, is
significant enough to stand alone and yet also part and parcel of
the second piece. Like many states’ pension systems for teachers
and other public employees, Michigan’s teachers’ pension system is
severely underfunded. The legacy costs continue to grow because
the total number of retirees across the state is growing and many of
them are former school district employees.131 This is even more of a
challenge than in many states because of the way the pension sys-
tem interacts with charter schools. Specifically, the high and
growing number of employees in charter schools do not contribute
to the pension system, and because of the declining enrollment in
traditional public schools, the growing legacy costs are borne by a
statewide public school system that is smaller and smaller.132
129. David Arsen et al., Which Districts Get into Financial Trouble and Why: Michigan’s Story 6,
(Educ. Policy Ctr. at Mich. State Univ., Working Paper No. 51, 2015), http://education.msu
.edu/epc/library/papers/documents/WP51-Which-Districts-Get-Into-Financial-Trouble-Ar-
sen.pdf (explaining that funds move with students when they transfer to other districts and
that, in 2014, the per pupil funding allowance was at or within $500 of the minimum founda-
tion allowance of $7,076). Not surprisingly, the decline in student enrollment and thus the
drop in per-pupil funding are not felt evenly across districts. Joshua M. Cowen, A Look at
Michigan’s Schools of Choice, GREEN & WRITE (Apr. 6, 2016), http://edwp.educ.msu.edu/
green-and-write/2016/a-look-at-michigans-schools-of-choice-what-do-we-know-and-what-do-
we-need-to-learn/ (supporting the notion that enrollment levels can be volatile from year to
year, negatively impacting a district’s ability to plan for fixed costs); id.
130. Citizens Research Council of Mich., Managing School District Finances in an Era of De-
clining Enrollment, CRC MEMORANDUM, Jan. 2015, at 6, http://crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/
2010s/2015/managing_school_district_finances_in_era_of_delining_enrollment-2015.pdf;
Arsen et al., supra note 129, at 12–13, 26.
131. See RACHEL WHITE ET AL., KNOWLEDGEABLE NAVIGATION TO AVOID THE ICEBERG: CON-
SIDERATIONS IN PROACTIVELY ADDRESSING SCHOOL DISTRICT FISCAL STRESS IN MICHIGAN 2–6
(2015), http://msue.anr.msu.edu/uploads/236/64601/MI_School_Fiscal_Health_Indicator
_System_2015-01-20.pdf (discussing fiscal problems in Michigan school districts).
132. Lauren Camera, America’s Bankrupt Schools—Pension plans could be the culprit behind
broke big-city school districts, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 18, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/
news/the-report/articles/2016-03-18/why-big-city-school-systems-are-going-broke.
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Not surprisingly, the state’s increases in education funding in re-
cent years often have been dwarfed by districts’ growing mandatory
contributions to the pension system (rising from 13% of employee
salaries in 2004 to almost 25% in 2012133). The result is a net per-
pupil loss to districts when calculated in terms of classroom dol-
lars.134 A 2016 costing-out study determined that the base level of
funding the state should provide per student is $8,667.135 However,
in FY 2010, $6,350 of the state of Michigan’s $7,316 foundation
grant remained after districts met retirement obligations. By FY
2014, only $5,882 of the $7,409 foundation grant was available to
districts.136
The fourth and final major piece in this web is that, like only
fourteen other states, Michigan requires that each school district
fully fund capital improvements rather than the state and the local
district sharing these costs.137 The greatest facility needs are often in
property-poor districts, which are often also districts that lose an
unusually high portion of their students to charter schools and to
other districts through the schools of choice program. This suggests
limited support for a local referendum. The shrinking districts are
often the least able to raise the needed funds, though they may be
the ones that need to invest in facilities the most.138
133. MICH. HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYS-
TEM 36 (2015), http://www.house.mi.gov/hfa/PDF/Retirement/MPSERS_Briefing_July
2015.pdf. A system that used to look like a triangle right side up (a limited amount of legacy
costs at the top supported by a much larger base of revenue) is on its way to looking more
like a triangle inverted. School districts’ and the state’s inability to financially grapple with
these challenges, too, connect back to the precipitous decline of the manufacturing industry
in Michigan. Pearce, supra note 120.
134. Citizens Research Council of Mich., Making Sense of K-12 Funding, CRC MEMORAN-
DUM, Oct. 2014, at 5 tbl.1 (2014), http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2014/
memo1130.pdf; see also Citizens Research Council of Mich., Detroit Public Schools’ Legacy Costs
and Indebtedness, CRC MEMORANDUM, Jan. 2016, http://crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/
2016/Detroit_schools_legacy_costs_indebtedness_2016.pdf.
135. Michael Addonizio & David Arsen, Study a Step to Getting Michigan School Funding
Right, DET. FREE PRESS (July 21, 2016, 10:15 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/con-
tributors/2016/07/21/michigan-school-funding/87395920/.
136. These figures account for additional state funds intended to offset the growing
mandatory contributions and adjust for inflation. Citizens Research Council of Mich., School
District Fiscal Health Improves, but Some Long-Term Challenges Remain, CRC MEMORANDUM, June
2014, at 6–7, http://crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2014/district_fiscal_health_improves_
long_term_challenges_remain-2014.pdf.
137. CTR. FOR CITIES & SCH., supra note 113, at 5.
138. See, e.g., Sarah Dewees, Improving Rural School Facilities for Teaching and Learning, ERIC
DIG. No. ED438153 (1999), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED438153.pdf (discussing the
connection between rural school districts’ lower property values, limited ability to generate
revenue, and facility needs); Beth Hawkins, Detroit’s Educational Catastrophe, ATLANTIC (May
10, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/05/detroits-school-crisis/
482010/; Arsen et al., 20–22, supra note 129; David Arsen & Mary Mason, The Role of State
Courts in Securing School Facility Adequacy and Equity, (Educ. Policy Ctr. at Mich. State Univ.,
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2. School Districts in Fiscal Crisis
The overlay of all of these factors on Michigan’s existing school
finance scheme exposed the system’s flaws and pushed it to the
breaking point. From FY 2011 through FY 2014, roughly fifty of
Michigan’s school districts were in deficit. The number was down to
fourteen in June 2017,139 but for most of the post-recession period,
Michigan had the largest number of deficit districts of any state in
the country including California140 even though the California
school system has also been in financial trouble, and California ed-
ucates roughly four times as many students as Michigan (the raw
number of deficit districts in California surpassed Michigan only in
Working Paper No. 31, 2010), http://education.msu.edu/epc/documents/Mason_Arsen_
2010_The_Role_of_State_Courts_in_Securing_School_Facility_Adequacy_and_Equity_policy
_report_31.pdf. The Fiscal Year 2017 minimum foundation grant was $7511. STATE BUDGET
OFFICE, STATE OF MICH., SCHOOL AID HIGHLIGHTS EXECUTIVE BUDGET FISCAL YEARS 2017 AND
2018 1 (2016), http://www.house.mi.gov/hfa/PDF/SchoolAid/School_Aid_Subcmte_Testi
mony_2-16-16_SecHighlights_fy17.pdf.
It may also be that Michigan’s graying population plays a role in this, with older adults
potentially less willing to vote for a local referendum and subsidize the cost of public educa-
tion when their children are grown and thus their families receive no direct benefit. Michigan
Population Trends, 1990–2015, MICH. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERV., http://www.mdch.state.mi.
us/pha/osr/CHI/POP/DP00_t1.asp (last updated July 19, 2016); see RACHEL WHITE ET AL.,
supra note 131, at 2–3.
139. Michigan enrolls 1.5 million children in 900 school districts (601 districts not includ-
ing public school academies, or school districts). MICH. DEP’T OF EDUC., FAST FACTS
2016–2017 (2017), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/MDE_Fast_Fact_379573_7.
pdf. As of June 2017, fourteen school districts were in deficit; one year earlier that number
was twenty-nine, two years earlier the number was forty-one, and three years earlier it was
over fifty. Memorandum from Brian Whiston, State Superintendent, to the Mich. House and
Senate K-12 Appropriations Comm. Attach. B (June 14, 2017), http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/mde/June_2017_Quarterly_Report_577111_7.pdf; Nicquel Terry, Mich. School
District Deficit List Cut to 23, DET. NEWS (June 19, 2016, 2:40 PM), http://www.detroitnews.
com/story/news/education/2016/06/19/michigan-school-district-deficit-list-cut/8612636
4/; see also Citizens Research Council of Mich., Managing School District Finances in an Era of
Declining Enrollment, supra note 130, at 3 (describing Michigan school districts’ recent fiscal
history).
140. California schools enroll 6.2 million children in about 1000 school districts. Califor-
nia Public K-12 Graded Enrollment and High School Graduate Projections by County—2016 Series,
CAL. DEP’T FIN., http://www.dof.ca.gov/Forecasting/Demographics/Projections/Public_K-
12_Graded_Enrollment/; Fingertip Facts on Education in California, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., http://
www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/cb/ceffingertipfacts.asp (last updated Sept. 29, 2016). The state’s ap-
proximately 1200 charter schools, which educate over 600,000 children, are not designated
as independent school districts. CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUICKQUEST, http://dq.cde.ca.gov/
dataquest/content.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (the search must first be set to “charter
schools” to view the relevant information). Forty-three of the state’s districts are in or pro-
jected to be in deficit. Second Interim Status Report, FY 2016–17, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., http://www.
cde.ca.gov/fg/fi/ir/second1617.asp (last updated May 25, 2017).
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mid-2017).141 The heterogeneity of Michigan’s deficit districts dem-
onstrates that the system’s flaws run deep.142 These districts are
urban, suburban, and rural. They have varying levels of students
with disabilities and students who are English language learners.
While the deficit districts are disproportionately poor and minority,
not all are so. And they range from very small districts to the state’s
largest and many in between.143
Between 2009 and 2016, four school districts were taken over by
emergency managers who effectively displaced the superintendent
and school board.144 Two districts were liquidated and their stu-
dents channeled into surrounding districts (it is still not entirely
clear who owns the liquidated districts’ debt).145 The emergency
managers in Detroit’s public schools were eventually phased out via
a radical reconfiguration of the district inspired by private-sector
bankruptcy in late 2016.146 Michigan continues to try to figure out
how to best assist districts in anticipating, averting, and managing
141. See Sharon Noguchi, K-12: ‘Tidal wave of Expenses’ in Looming California School Budget
Crisis, MERCURY NEWS (July 6, 2017, 9:23 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/07/02/
tidal-wave-of-expenses-in-looming-california-school-budget-crisis/.
142. In mid-2015, forty-one Michigan districts were in deficit. In December 2016, only
twenty-two districts remained in deficit. Terry, supra note 140; Memorandum from Brian
Whiston, supra note 140, attach. B.
143. Kristi L. Bowman, MI School Districts in Fiscal Crisis, Sept. 2014 (FY2014) (on file
with author) (table developed from Common Core of Data 2011–12 school year, and Michi-
gan school districts in fiscal crisis as of Sept. 2014); Memorandum from Mike Flanagan, State
Superintendent, to Mich. House and Senate K-12 Appropriations Comm. (Sept. 11, 2014),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/Quarterly_Deficit_District__Report_FINAL_9_
11_14_468492_7.pdf.
144. See Emergency Financial Manager/Emergency Manager Appointment History, MICH. DEP’T
TREASURY, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/EM-EFM_Appointment_Histo
ry_2-12-16_514604_7.pdf? (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (providing details of emergency manager
appointments in Michigan since 1990, including the Inkster, Detroit, Highland Park, and
Muskegon Heights school districts); Kristi L. Bowman, State Takeovers of School Districts and
Related Litigation: Michigan as a Case Study, 45 URB. LAW. 1, 7–8 (2013).
145. Lindsey Knake, Gov. Snyder Signs Buena Vista, Inkster Schools Dissolution Process Into
Law, MLIVE (July 2, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/saginaw/index.ssf/2013/
07/gov_snyder_signs_buena_vista_i.html; Jake Neher, Buena Vista, Inkster School Districts To Be
Dissolved, MICH. RADIO (July 22, 2013), http://michiganradio.org/post/buena-vista-inkster-
school-districts-be-dissolved#stream/0; Brian Smith, Senate Narrowly Approves School Dissolution
Bills on Buena Vista, Inkster Districts, MLIVE (June 19, 2013, 7:10 PM), http://www.mlive.com/
education/index.ssf/2013/06/senate_narrowly_approves_schoo.html.
146. Associated Press, Rhodes Could Exit School System Post Early If Legislation Stalls, CRAIN’S
DET. BUS. (Mar. 3, 2016 12:00 PM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20160303/NEWS
01/160309950; Curt Guyette, After Six Years and Four State-Appointed Managers, Detroit Public
Schools’ Debt Has Grown Even Deeper, DET. METRO TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.metro
times.com/detroit/after-six-years-and-four-state-appointed-managers-detroit-public-schools-
debt-is-deeper-than-ever/Content?oid=2302010; see also Kathleen Gray, Legislature OKs $617m
Detroit Public Schools Rescue Plan, DET. FREE PRESS (June 9, 2016, 10:33 AM), http://www.freep.
com/story/news/politics/2016/06/09/dps-package-wins-gop-support-headed-gov-snyder/
85630880/.
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fiscal crises.147 Not surprisingly, school districts in fiscal crisis are
hardly places of educational achievement and innovation.148
Although a limited amount of school districts’ fiscal troubles may
be due to local mismanagement or malfeasance, the fiscal crisis in
these districts is largely the natural result of state policies enacted
through statute and executive action.149 In many states—and in-
deed in other states with constitutional language similar to
Michigan’s—plaintiffs could challenge the state action through
what would likely be protracted school finance litigation.150 As the
recent research by economists Lafortune, Rothstein, Schanzenback,
Jackson, Johnson, and Persico demonstrates, a judicial remedy
could reduce school finance inequality across the state and improve
educational quality for some students.151 And as philosopher Anne
Newman suggests, a judicial remedy coupled with community sup-
port could lead to long-lasting, positive, far-reaching change.152 But,
that has not happened in Michigan because the conventional wis-
dom is that the right to education in the state constitution is a thin
access right. Neither the legislature, executive, nor judiciary has
been willing and able to create a higher floor.
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court noted when deciding Papasan
v. Allain that Rodriguez and Plyler left open the question of whether
there was a federal right to an education of a minimum quality.153 If
so, even a thin federal quality right would exceed the contours of
the right to education, such as it is, in a state like Michigan. State
law in Michigan has not established the floor that we have assumed
exists. If this failure is happening in a state ranked on the low side
of average by many indicators, it is troubling to think about what
must be happening in states ranked even closer to the bottom.
147. See Kyle Feldscher, Gov. Snyder Signs Early Warning Bills That Could Increase State’s Role
in Fixing Districts’ Finances, MLIVE (July 7, 2015, 10:46 AM), http://www.mlive.com/lansing-
news/index.ssf/2015/07/gov_snyder_signs_early_financi.html. See generally WHITE ET AL.,
supra note 138.
148. Del Stover, Take It to the Limit, AM. SCH. BOARD J., Nov. 2007, at 33 (“Limited finan-
cial resources, coupled with the effects of poverty and high populations of limited English-
proficient students, make significant academic gains challenging to any school leadership,
regardless of its composition or governance structure.”).
149. Arsen et al., supra note 129, 24.
150. See generally Litigation, EDUC. FIN. STAT. CTR., https://nces.ed.gov/edfin/litiga-
tion.asp (last visited Aug. 16, 2017) (providing a “listing of many school finance cases with
citations.”); SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, supra note 27 (providing a state by state examination of
education finance litigation and happenings).
151. See generally Lafortune, Rothstein & Schanzenbach, supra note 32; Jackson, Johnson
& Persico, supra note 33, at 15–17.
152. See ANNE NEWMAN, REALIZING EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS 69–70 (2013) (describing the
community reaction to Rose v. Council for Better Ed., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)).
153. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283–85 (1986); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
221–23 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973).
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C. More Judicial Abdication
Michigan’s school finance system has remained largely un-
changed for the past twenty years.154 This stagnation is unusual, as
school funding reform efforts have remained active across the
country during this time.155 Although preserving the status quo may
be acceptable in some states, maintaining the status quo in Michi-
gan means preserving a broken system. In addition to the nationally
record-setting number of school districts that have operated in defi-
cit, student achievement levels and physical conditions of school
buildings in many parts of Michigan are abysmal.156
Because traditional school finance litigation has been unsuccess-
ful, a few years ago the Michigan ACLU tried an innovative
approach. In 2012, the organization filed suit on behalf of children
in the small, high-poverty, mostly African-American school district
of Highland Park, bringing claims that were grounded in both lib-
erty and equality.157 A crucial premise in the plaintiffs’ amended
complaint was that the state and local defendants failed to comply
154. See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 11 (the text of proposal A was amended to the Michigan
constitution in 1994 and has not been modified since); Arsen et al., supra note 129, at 25.
155. See, e.g., Daniel Thatcher, School Finance Litigation Citations, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TORS, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-RSkKDG1qUOpxpZ2DoKvN-cHFKIk53L
WLcGxTEpAqcY/edit#gid=0 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (providing an online spreadsheet list-
ing over 170 major school finance decisions from state courts the 1970s through 2017).
156. See, e.g., Julie Bosman, Crumbling, Destitute Schools Threaten Detroit’s Recovery, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/us/crumbling-destitute-schools-
threaten-detroits-recovery.html; Press Release, Educ. Tr.—Midwest, Michigan Students Fall Fur-
ther Behind Nation in Early Literacy (Oct. 28, 2015), https://midwest.edtrust.org/press_re
lease/2015-naep-release/.
157. Amended Complaint & Petition for Writ of Mandamus, S.S. ex rel. LM v. State, No.
12-009231-CZ (Cir. Ct. Wayne Cty. 2013) (denying summary disposition), https://www.
clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/ED-MI-0002-0003.pdf [hereinafter Amended Complaint],
rev’d, LM v. State, 862 N.W.2d 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (No. 317071, 317072, 317073, 2013
Term; renumbered No. 15680), cert. denied, 869 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. 2015), (Complaint was
filed on May 8, 2012); see also The Right to Read, ACLU MICH., (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www
.aclumich.org/article/right-read. This case is also reminiscent of unsuccessful education mal-
practice claims. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Pennington Sch., No. 06-2101, 2008 WL 160588, at *6
(E.D. Pa., Jan. 15, 2008); Press Release, ACLU, Highland Park Students File Class-Action
“Right to Read” Lawsuit (July 12, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/news/highland-park-students-
file-class-action-right-read-lawsuit.
In 2012, the Highland Park district enrolled fewer than 1000 students and, as of summer
2016, enrolled just over 310. Amended Complaint, supra note 157, ¶ 78 (noting 973 student
enrolled as of 2012); Curt Guyette, The Disappearing District: What’s Happened to Highland Park
Schools?, DET. METRO TIMES (July 6, 2016), https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/the-disap-
pearing-district-shredded-democracy-lost-students-and-unanswered-debt-questions-in-
highland-park/Content?oid=2453382 (saying there were 311 students in the district as of
June 2016). In 2015 the district closed the high school program. Kyle Feldscher, Highland
Park Schools to No Longer Offer Classes to High School Students, MLIVE (May 28, 2015, 7:04 PM),
http://www.mlive.com/lansing-news/index.ssf/2015/05/highland_park_schools_to_no_lo.
html.
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with a state statute that requires “special assistance reasonably ex-
pected to enable [a] pupil to bring his or her reading skills to grade
level within 12 months” when a student “does not score satisfacto-
rily on the fourth or seventh grade reading test.”158 To illustrate the
reality of students reading far below grade level, the complaint
quoted several named plaintiffs’ written responses when asked what
they would like to tell the Governor about their school. The follow-
ing statement by a seventh grader is representative:
My name is [redacted] and you can make the school gooder
by getting people that will do the jod that is pay for get a foot-
ball tame for the kinds mybe a baksball tamoe get a other
jamtacher for the school get a lot of tacher.159
As the complaint noted: “in this writing sample, [the student]
spelled his own name incorrectly.”160 At the time the complaint was
filed, the student (then in seventh grade) read at a first-grade level.
Like the other named plaintiffs, he was not hampered by a disability
nor was he an English language learner.161 Reading significantly be-
low grade level is not only a reading problem for this child and
others across the country: it has compounding consequences be-
cause students reading below grade level are unable to absorb
content across the curriculum. At the time the complaint was filed,
the dropout rate in Highland Park was 23% (double the statewide
rate) and of those students who did remain in school through their
senior year, 90–100% failed the state’s final tests in reading, writing,
math, social studies, and science.162
158. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1278(8) (West Supp. 2017); see also Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 157, ¶ 4. Because this provision implicates state and local actors, the named
defendants in the litigation included the state itself, the state board of education, the state
superintendent, the district’s emergency manager, the district, the new incarnation of the
school district as a charter school district, and the charter school management company.
Amended Complaint, supra note 157, ¶ 11. Plaintiffs sued the named individuals in their
official capacity; they sued the state because it had consented to be sued for alleged violations
of its statutes and constitution; they sued the charter operator as a Michigan LLC. Id. ¶ 17.
This statute, plaintiffs contended, was enacted to execute the Michigan constitution’s educa-
tion provisions. Id. ¶ 3; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1–2.
159. Amended Complaint, supra note 157, ¶ 35.
160. Id.
161. Id. ¶¶ 19, 36.
162. Id. ¶ 82. A study in persuasive advocacy, the complaint also noted that the district
rarely had enough books so that students could take home their own copy and many school
buildings were so poorly heated that children wore winter coats and gloves in class. Id. ¶ 86.
Furthermore, classrooms sometimes held more students than they had chairs, school bath-
rooms were “often smeared with feces, lack of toilet paper and paper towels, and missing stall
doors and other features,” and the security was so poor that a homeless man lived in a school
building undetected by school officials. Id. Additionally, roughly one-third of teachers held a
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The ACLU publicized this case as being about a “right to read,”
and in that way it was a relatively modest companion to education
rights litigation victories across the country. The Rose v. Council for
Better Education litigation in Kentucky, for example, resulted in es-
tablishing seven learning goals for each child.163 The right to read
lawsuit also echoed a national shift from the 1970s litigation focus-
ing on equality in inputs towards more recent litigation examining
whether schools are financed at a level that they can provide a con-
stitutionally adequate education. In contrast to the Governor
litigation, though, the ACLU case was not explicitly an education
finance case.
Like the Governor litigation, the right to read case was initially
successful. About one year after the case was filed, the trial court
denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the state statutory and other
constitutional claims, concluding that the state constitution estab-
lished a duty to provide public schools at a certain level of quality.164
Also like the Governor litigation, plaintiffs’ success did not last. In
2014, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected all of plaintiffs’
claims.165 Reflecting the complexity of education structural reform
Masters degree or higher compared to 77% in Detroit Public Schools, and students’ official
records were woefully incomplete. Id. The complaint culminated in four causes of action and
plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that defendants violated the statutory provision
requiring special assistance to fourth and seventh grade students who were not proficient in
reading. Id. ¶¶ 102, 116–25. Plaintiffs contended that the state and local defendants denied
the students’ right under the state constitution “to a basic and adequate education affording
them elemental literacy skills and knowledge appropriate to their age and development,” and
that defendants violated the students’ equal protection right under the state constitution to
receive educational opportunities provided to students in other districts. Id. ¶¶ 118–21.
Plaintiffs also requested that the court order a writ of mandamus directing the defendants to
provide the reading assistance required under the statute. Id. ¶¶ 122–25.
163. Kentucky: Historical Background, SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, http://schoolfunding.info/lit-
igation-map/kentucky/#1484023070798-ae032cc2-e640 (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
164. Notably, the trial court first held that although there was no express private right of
action in the statute, an implied private right of action existed because the students who
alleged wrongdoing are the individuals whom the statute was created to protect. S.S. ex rel.
LM v. State, No. 12-009231-CZ (Cir. Ct. Wayne Cty. 2013) , (Complaint was filed on May 8,
2012); https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/ED-MI-0002-0004.pdf [hereinafter
Trial Court Opinion], rev’d, LM v. State, 862 N.W.2d 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (No. 317071,
317072, 317073, 2013 Term; renumbered No. 15680), cert. denied, 869 N.W.2d 273 (Mich.
2015). It also held granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the equal protection claim due to
lack of comparative evidence in the pleadings. Id. at 7–9. The trial court also found that the
statutory duty and the trigger for exercising the statutory duty were sufficiently specific that
they were ministerial, thus a writ of mandamus could be an appropriate remedy. Id. at 10–11.
Additionally, the trial court determined that the Michigan emergency manager statute,
which contained an immunity provision, did not shield the defendants from liability because
plaintiffs did not allege a violation of that statute and, furthermore, a statute cannot immu-
nize the state for a constitutional violation. Id. at 12–13.
165. LM v. State, 862 N.W.2d 246, 257–58 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, 869 N.W.2d
273 (Mich. 2015).
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litigation nationwide over the past half-century, the appellate
judges’ opinions channeled disputes about federalism, school fi-
nance, liberty, and equality that echo over decades. In some ways,
the opinions seem timeless. Ultimately, the majority opined that the
case was nonjusticiable despite the grievous harms to the children
in the district.166 The dissent began by quoting Brown v. Board of
Education’s famous statement that “education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments” and accused
the majority of judicially repealing Michigan’s constitutional provi-
sions regarding education.167 While the lawsuit wound its way
166. Id.
While there is little genuine controversy that the district defendants have abysmally
failed their pupils, the mechanism to correct this failure is not through the court
system, particularly given the remedy sought by plaintiffs. The problem is mul-
tifaceted, comprised of deficiencies in the manner and type of academic instruction
received, but also impacted by a variety of social and economic forces unique to the
circumstances of each student. Consequently, there is no one-size-fits-all solution and
the greatest impact for each student will be one that is made up of several components
and addresses his or her individual needs. Such a solution is not available through
judicial intervention.
Id.
The appellate majority also reiterated the conventional wisdom about the extremely lim-
ited nature of the right to education in Michigan’s constitution, relying like others had done
primarily on federal law and secondarily on the Governor II concurrence. See id., at 252–53
(“[T]he Michigan Constitution require[s] only that the legislature provide for and finance a
system of free public schools. [It] leaves the actual intricacies of the delivery of specific edu-
cational services to the local school districts.”). The majority also held that the state
defendants had no duty under the statutory provision and furthermore that the school dis-
tricts were not liable for this alleged statutory violation. See id., at 254–57.
The concurring opinion picked up where the majority left off, citing U.S. Supreme Court
decisions for the proposition that “judges are not equipped to decide matters of educational
policy,” then emphasizing this point and illustrating it in detail. Id. at 259 (Murray, J. concur-
ring). The concurrence also distinguished persuasive authority from other states. See id. at
259–60 (Murray, J., concurring).
For an explanation of how the majority and concurrence opinions echo larger, long-
standing education law and policy debates, see Yudof et al., supra note 92, at 957–64. See
generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(2d ed. 2008); THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC EQUALITY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
supra note 48; Christine M. O’Neill, Closing the Door on Positive Rights: State Court Use of the
Political Question Doctrine to Deny Access to Educational Adequacy Claims, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 545 (2009).
167. LM, 862 N.W.2d at 262 (Shapiro, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); see also id. at 263 (“While the judiciary is not suited to selecting and
executing educational policy, it is suited to determining whether defendants are complying
with their constitutional and statutory duties and ordering them to take timely action to do
so.”). The dissent offered its own robust interpretation of Michigan’s constitutional provi-
sions which it supported by summarizing state supreme court decisions in eight other states
that interpreted state constitutional language similar to Michigan’s and uniformly held that
the language established a constitutional right to a certain minimum quality level of educa-
tion. See id. at 264–66; see also id. at 267–69 (discussing decisions relating to the state
constitutions and a minimum quality level of education in Arkansas, Kentucky, including the
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through the courts and received national media attention,168 High-
land Park remained an educational wasteland.169 In 2015, almost
one year after the appellate decision, the Michigan Supreme Court
declined to hear the appeal and the case came to a close.170 That
same year, students in the two Highland Park K-8 charter schools
that had replaced the district’s traditional public schools a few years
prior demonstrated 6% and 9% proficiency in third grade Lan-
guage Arts and 16% and 12% proficiency in seventh grade
Language Arts.171
Although the right to read case did not raise school finance is-
sues directly, it seems that even the two concurring justices in the
famous Rose v. Council for Better Ed., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), litigation, New Hamp-
shire, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Washington). The dissent
also rejected the majority’s conclusion that the statutory claims should be dismissed and held
that that mandamus is proper when, as here, it will compel the mandatory exercise of discre-
tion. See id. at 271–74.
168. E.g. Lyndsey Layton, ACLU Alleges Michigan School District Violated Students’ ‘Right to
Learn to Read’, WASH. POST (July 12, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/educa-
tion/aclu-alleges-michigan-school-district-violated-students-right-to-learn-to-read/2012/07/
11/gJQArf1jeW_story.html; Eyder Peralta, ACLU Files ‘Groundbreaking’ Lawsuit Claiming Right
To Learn To Read, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: TWO-WAY BLOG (July 13, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://www
.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/07/13/156728852/aclu-files-groundbreaking-lawsuit-
claiming-right-to-learn-to-read.
169. See, e.g., Lori Higgins, Highland Park Losing Its High School to Low Enrollment, DET. FREE
PRESS (May 28, 2015, 7:05 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/wayne /
2015/05/28/highland-park-high-school-closing-emergency-manager/28094165/; Layton,
supra note 168; Peralta, supra note 168.
170. SS v. State, 869 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. 2015).
171. Michigan’s Department of Education measured two charter school systems in High-
land Park in 2015: (i) the Highland Park Public Academy School System, which ran Barber
Elementary School, and (ii) the George Washington Carver Academy, which ran George
Washington Carver Elementary and Middle Schools. See Database: Search M-STEP Results by
School or District, DET. FREE PRESS (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/
michigan/2015/12/17/database-search-m-step-results-school-district/77421474/ (a database
listing the 2015 results of student proficiency in Michigan schools). Students at Barber Ele-
mentary School showed a 5.88% proficiency in Third Grade English and a 16.22%
proficiency in Seventh Grade English. Id. (select the county “Wayne RESA” and the district
“Highland Park Public School Academy System” and click the “Details” tab next to the “Dis-
trictwide” option). Students at George Washington Carver Elementary and Middle Schools
showed an 8.82% proficiency in Third Grade English and a 12.31% proficiency in Seventh
Grade English. Id. (select the county “Wayne RESA” and the district “George Washington
Carver Academy” and click the “Details” tab next to the “Districtwide” option). In the
2011–12 school year, roughly one-third of fourth graders and one-quarter of seventh graders
in Highland Park satisfied the state standard for grade-level reading proficiency, and only
about one-tenth of students in either of those grades demonstrated proficiency in math. This
makes Michigan’s statewide scores of 50% proficiency in third grade Language Arts and 49%
proficiency in seventh grade Language Arts look good by comparison. See Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 157, ¶¶ 6, 79; MICH. STUDENT TEST OF EDUC. PROGRESS, SPRING 2015
STATEWIDE M-STEP RESULTS (2015), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/S15_M-
STEP_Statewide_Results_504573_7.pdf.
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Governor II decision would have been open to hearing this case. Af-
ter all, they noted that it was significant that they were not
“presented with a concrete claim by either individual students or by
school districts that they are suffering from particular specified edu-
cational inadequacies because of deficiencies in the school
financing system.”172 The state’s school finance system—and the
web of related policies—contributed to the failure of public educa-
tion in Highland Park.
* * *
Early in this article, another commentator’s question was raised
as something to be answered before making the case for a greater
federal role in education: are states “unwilling and unable to deal
with the structural problems created by educational policies”?173 If
they are willing and able, the commentator’s argument continued,
then a larger federal role is not needed. Although an exhaustive
state-by-state analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, this Article
has demonstrated that at least in the case of Michigan, the answer is
sadly clear.
Additionally, although Michigan is only one state, its experience
operates as an outsized caution against the specific policy of unfet-
tered school choice and the more general model of education
federalism (dual federalism) that involves great deference to state
and local authorities.174 Regarding the federalism model, if the abil-
ity to define a “right to education” remains exclusively with the
states, then state courts—the backstop for education rights—can in-
terpret this right so minimally that they effectively refuse to
consider the question of educational quality at all. Moving forward,
the form of federalism in education must shift to a cooperative one,
and reforms must be grounded in both liberty and equality. In Sep-
tember 2016, some of the attorneys who brought the “right to read”
case in state court filed a complaint in federal court with just this
approach.175 As of October 2017, the complaint awaits the federal
district court’s ruling on the state’s motion to dismiss.
172. Milliken v. Green (Governor II), 212 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Mich. 1973).
173. Lawson, supra note 18, at 286.
174. See Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 972–83.
175. Complaint, Gary B. v. Snyder, No. 2:16-CV-13292 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2016), 2016
WL 4775474.
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III. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Fortunately for the children of this country, education federalism
does not fail all states—some states have robust school finance sys-
tems and related policies that produce education of an acceptable
level of quality (or higher), and do so more or less uniformly. In
other states, judicial intervention has remedied constitutionally and
functionally inadequate systems. However, as the previous section
demonstrated, not all states are willing and able to address struc-
tural problems in public education. Because the Trump
Administration is likely to support school choice nationwide,  it is
important to consider a range of federal legal protections that
could create and maintain a meaningful federal floor of educa-
tional quality.
This Section first discusses action that Congress and the U.S. De-
partment of Education could take, with the idea that legislative and
agency-driven reforms are theoretically easier to enact and also
have the long-term potential to be more effective, at least in some
ways, than judicial reforms. That said, this Article also acknowledges
that the reforms proposed here are unlikely to be supported by the
Trump Administration or the current Congress and thus may be
more viable in the long-term than in the short-term. Because judi-
cial reforms sometimes occur when legislative and executive
reforms cannot, and because judicial reforms are more difficult to
undo, this Section then turns to the courts. Specifically, by coupling
the concepts of liberty and equality, this Section ultimately pro-
poses a de facto federal constitutional amendment through
interpretation that engages both the Equal Protection Clause and
Substantive Due Process.176 At the heart of each of the approaches
considered in this section is, as law professor Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson has advocated, a shift in our approach to public educa-
tion from dual federalism to cooperative federalism.177
A. Federal Legislation and Agency Action
Congress has legislated about public education regularly since
the 1960s, and for good reason. As California Supreme Court Jus-
tice Goodwin Liu articulated in 2006, the Citizenship Clause is one
176. See generally Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach
Can Inform Judicial and Executive Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381
(2011) (arguing for a “coordinated effort” between branches as an effective way to solve
agency problems).
177. Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, supra note 5, passim.
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source of authority for Congress’s involvement in education policy,
and of course the Fourteenth Amendment is connected to this.178
For various reasons, Congress seems quite willing to continue legis-
lating about public education. Additionally as Robinson
convincingly argues, even after the Court’s 2012 decision limiting
Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause in National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius,179 Congress retains substantial
authority to legislate about education—and the legislative and exec-
utive branch are in some ways better suited to education reform
than the judiciary.180
Congressional Acts often go hand-in-hand with federal agency
enforcement, and thus the U.S. Department of Education has sub-
stantial experience by this point in time interpreting and enforcing
statutory and constitutional law. This role is nothing new either in
the specific context of education or in the general context of the
federal government,181 and in fact federal agencies are especially
important today in what law professor Karen Tani calls the “age of
cooperative federalism.”182 Accordingly, the combination of Con-
gressional action and agency enforcement can be a powerful tool in
the pursuit of educational quality. Examples of that partnership
include:
• Title IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which ad-
dress race discrimination;183
• The Bilingual Education Act of 1968 (repealed in 2002)
and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974,184
which establish rights for non-native English-speaking
students;
178. Liu, supra note 11, at 339, 348–67.
179. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
180. Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 1006–13.
181. See, e.g., Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 827–32 (2015) (providing a history of
administrative enforcement of equal protection since 1936).
182. Id. at 837; see also id. at 837–41.
183. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2012).
184. Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974; Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 204, 88 Stat.
484, 515 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2012)); Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783 (1968) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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• The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975,185 which was superseded by the Individuals with Disa-
bilities in Education Act of 1990;186 Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973;187 and Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990,188 which all serve to make
schools accessible to students with disabilities;
• Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,189 which
provides for sex and gender equity in schools; and
• The McKinney Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987,190
which ensures educational access for homeless children.
In short, the Department of Education is involved in enforcing a
wide range of statutes, and has been for quite some time.
Of course, the federal government’s broadest regulation of edu-
cation remains the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA).191 Since its enactment, ESEA has been reauthorized and
amended roughly every five years.192 Although ESEA began as part
of President Johnson’s war on poverty, and thus provided supple-
mental funds for the education of students in poverty, it has grown
substantially since then. The most well-known rendition of the law
may be the 2001 variation, the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB).193 NCLB was notable because it required states to develop
proficiency standards, test students’ proficiency on a regular basis,
185. Pub. L. 94-142, § 4, 89 Stat. 775 (1975).
186. Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended in 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400–1409 (2012)).
187. Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)).
188. Pub. L. 101-336, § 204, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (1990) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 121301–-12165 (2012)).
189. Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) (codified as amended in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688
(2012)).
190. Pub. L. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11431–11489); see 42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)(1)(J)(iii)(I) (2012) (ensuring educational access
for homeless children).
191. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965)
(codified as amended in 20 U.S.C. §§6301–6578 (2012)).
192. Kristi L. Bowman, Before School Districts Go Broke: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 79 U.
CINCINNATI L. REV. 895, 901 (2011); see also Alyson Klein, ESEA Reauthorization: The Every Stu-
dent Succeeds Act Explained, EDUC. WEEK (Nov. 30, 2015, 10:59 AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/
edweek/campaign-k-12/2015/11/esea_reauthorization_the_every.html (referring to the
“typical five” years between reauthorization and amendment).
193. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C including, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1041–1044, 3427,
6052, 6053e, 6054b, 6055h, 6056a (2012)).
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and make regular progress towards uniform proficiency.194 The
goal was noble, and the Act sought to incorporate the current
model of education federalism, dual federalism, deferring signifi-
cantly to state and local authorities.195 However, many problems
emerged, not the least of which was schools’ inability to make suffi-
cient progress toward the goal of uniform proficiency even though
the states themselves determined what was proficient.196
Had Congress reauthorized the Act on the usual timeline,
lawmakers could have revised the statute to include more realistic
goals. By the time the Act was reauthorized as the Every Student
Succeeds Act in December 2015,197 though, nearly all states seemed
to need waivers to comply with NCLB so that they could continue to
receive the federal funding that makes up roughly 10% of an aver-
age school district’s budget.198 As law professor Derek Black
chronicles, under Secretary of Education Arne Duncan’s direction,
the Department took the unprecedented step of conditioning its
granting of waivers on states adopting certain policies.199 This ap-
proach is only permissible if the authorizing statute provides
sufficient notice—which NCLB did not, but future iterations of
ESEA could.200 Interestingly, at the same time that NCLB unfolded
nationwide, states’ standards became increasingly uniform: as of
2016, forty-two states and the District of Columbia had adopted the
Common Core State Standards.201
Theoretically, this may open a political window for federal in-
volvement in establishing a minimum quality level via the next
(post-ESSA) iteration of ESEA. Before continuing this conversation,
however, it is important to note that neither the new Congress nor
the new Administration seem likely to want to pursue this course of
194. Martin R. West, No Child Left Behind: How to Give it a Passing Grade, POL’Y BRIEF
(Brookings Inst., Washington, DC), Dec. 2005, at 1–4, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/06/pb149.pdf.
195. Id. at 4 (“Because NCLB allows states to create their own tests and to define the level
of achievement required for students to be deemed proficient, states vary widely in their
expectations of what students should know.”).
196. Id. at 3–5.
197. Pub. L. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
20 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
198. Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 607, 611 (2015).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 611. For a more general treatment of the waiver issue, see David J. Barron &
Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013).
201. Standards in Your State, COMMON CORE ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www.core
standards.org/standards-in-your-state/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). Admittedly, the federal gov-
ernment’s Race to the Top Grant assisted in this process. Black, Federalizing Education by
Waiver?, supra note 198, at 650–51. For a fascinating discussion of the role of the Gates Foun-
dation and other philanthropic organizations in this change, see SARAH RECKHOW, FOLLOW
THE MONEY: HOW FOUNDATION DOLLARS CHANGE PUBLIC SCHOOL POLITICS (2013).
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action. But for a Congress or an Administration so inclined, this
option would be attractive because although the ESEA regulations
are conditions on the receipt of funding rather than mandates, no
state has yet been able to opt out of receiving this funding and thus
opt out of abiding by these conditions.202 Even more significantly,
imposing a uniform floor of educational quality in part through na-
tional standards (opportunity-to-learn203 or otherwise) could still
allow states some options but limit the choice to the two or three
sets of standards widely adopted nationally, assuming those are at a
sufficient level. Additionally, the enforcement would not be via law-
suit but would be through the executive branch (the Department of
Education) via the potential loss of the funds to which the policy
strings were attached.204 Funding cutoff is a tool that has given the
federal government significant and effective persuasive authority
throughout history, including during the very difficult process of
school desegregation beginning in the 1960s.205 Furthermore, such
enforcement would provide political cover to state legislatures who
need to raise taxes, repurpose funding streams, or enact other un-
derstandably unpopular policies in order to comply with the
conditions of receiving ESEA funding.
There are disadvantages to congressional action and executive
enforcement, of course. If actually enforced, funding cutoffs are
not particularly helpful in a situation of constrained resources.206 A
legislative policy is much easier to overturn than a judicial one, thus
education would remain politicized, albeit at a different level. Per-
haps even more significantly, though, some political actors believe
the federal government should have an incredibly limited role in
social welfare services such as education. Indeed, the 2015 version
of ESEA (ESSA) pulled back from NCLB’s highly regulatory ap-
proach, deferring more to the states.207 Relatedly, it is not unusual
to hear a politician propose eliminating the U.S. Department of
202. See, e.g., West, supra note 194, at 1.
203. See Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 988–94 (explaining how
to incentivize development of common opportunity-to-learn standards).
204. See Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the
Funding Cutoff, 124 YALE L.J. 248 (2014) (describing why funding cutoffs should be used as
policy levers).
205. Id. at 252; see Orfield, supra note 70, at 407 (explaining the context of school deseg-
regation in the 1960s and how funding cutoff fit in); Tani, supra note 181, at 838–41
(describing the extent to which states rely on federal agencies’ purse strings).
206. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 176, at 1419 (“[C]utting the budget of an agency is likely
only to exacerbate the problem of delay.”).
207. See Alyson Klein, The Every Student Succeeds Act: An ESSA Overview, EDUC. WEEK (Mar.
31, 2016), http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/every-student-succeeds-act/index.html; Sarah
D. Sparks, NCLB Rewrite Sets New Path on School Research, EDUC. WEEK (Jan. 5, 2016), http://
www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/01/06/nclb-rewrite-sets-new-path-on-school.html.
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Education altogether, and in fact a member of Congress intro-
duced such a bill in February 2017.208 Thus, while ease of statutory
repeal is one disadvantage, inability to enact a statutory reform in
the first place may be an even more significant one, especially in
today’s political climate. Finally, the more directive federal educa-
tion legislation becomes, the closer it gets to the trigger the Court
established in NFIB v. Sebelius when it struck down legislation as hav-
ing “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from
coercion.”209 It appears highly likely that current federal education
legislation remains compliant with Spending Clause requirements,
but future legislation must be mindful of this decision.210
The impact this approach could have for local districts is uncer-
tain because the contours of Congressional action and executive
enforcement could vary so widely. However, if any real federal qual-
ity floor for public education is created, it would seem that states
would be compelled to assist local districts in a meaningful manner
so that every school offers students an education at a certain basic
level of quality. Many schools across Michigan, and indeed across
the entire country, would benefit.
B. A Federal “Amendment” by Interpretation
At last, this article turns to the idea of a change via federal courts.
This is not a perfect solution so much so that it is also a last resort—
although given the education policy to which Congress, Secretary
of Education Betsy DeVos, and the rest of the Trump Administra-
tion seem receptive, common law change may be the most likely
vehicle for progress in the short term. While courts are the back-
stop for legislative and executive (and lower court) action gone
awry, unlike legislatures, they hear only issues brought to them and
208. See Anya Kamenetz, About That Bill Abolishing the Department of Education, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO: EDUC., (Feb. 9, 2017, 12:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/02/09/
514148945/about-that-bill-abolishing-the-department-of-education (mentioning Representa-
tive Thomas Massie’s bill to eliminate the Department of Education at the end of 2018);
Alyson Klein, Which GOP Presidential Candidates Want to Abolish the Education Department?,
EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 19, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/
2015/10/which-GOP-presidential-candidates-want-to-abolish-education-department.html
(noting that Senator Ted Cruz of Texas said he would abolish the Department of Education
if elected President of the United States).
209. 567 U.S. 519, 579 (2012) (plurality opinion) (citing New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 175 (1992)).
210. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After
NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 887–92 (2013); Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v.
Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 651 (2013); Robinson,
Disrupting Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 1010.
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opine about cases and controversies. Additionally, scholars have
raised important questions about courts’ limited ability to produce
social change.211 Finally, changing federal common law is certainly
not for the faint of heart. However, the central benefits of this ap-
proach are that when constitutional change is accomplished, it is
applicable nationwide and profoundly difficult to undo.
The conventional manner of amending the Constitution is via a
proposal from Congress to the states under Article V.212 In today’s
hyper-politicized environment, it is all but impossible to imagine a
proposed federal constitutional amendment about a social welfare
issue over which states have historically had so much authority be-
ing successful via this route.213 Another way of effectively amending
the Constitution, though, is through judicial interpretation.214 This
approach is far more likely to succeed than an amendment through
ratification, though the chances may still be slim. That said, the
Court’s jurisprudence has left a door cracked open in Substantive
Due Process.215 Coupling this interpretation with the Court’s in-
creasing use of rational basis with bite in Equal Protection (which is
connected to the slow disintegration of the scrutiny categories216)
creates the potential for federal courts to reenter the education re-
form arena in a meaningful way, engaging liberty and equality
simultaneously.
1. Education and Liberty: Substantive Due Process
Numerous scholars have noted that the Court’s decisions in Rod-
riguez, Plyler, Papasan, and Kadrmas have left open the question of
whether there is a federal fundamental right to an education of a
211. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 166, at 10–21.
212. U.S. CONST., ART. V.
213. See, e.g., Russell Berman, What’s the Answer to Political Polarization in the U.S.?, ATLAN-
TIC (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/whats-the-
answer-to-political-polarization/470163/ (speaking to the depth of American political
polarization).
214. See Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times Has
the United States Constitution Been Amended?) (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) All of the Above), 8
CONST. COMM. 409, 418–21 (1991) (describing judicial interpretation as a form of “amend-
ment” to the underlying text).
215. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
221–223 (1982) (quoting Rodriguez’s discussion of education as a fundamental right); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973) (discussing education as a
fundamental right for which there may be a substantive floor).
216. See, e.g., Susannah Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739,
788–96 (2014) (providing a review of the relevant literature).
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minimum quality.217 These discussions have occurred in the context
of the Equal Protection Clause and, perhaps as a result, a com-
monly proposed alternative in a rich resulting literature is to
recognize education as a positive federal right that would then trig-
ger strict scrutiny.218 Indeed, this approach is similar to the positive
right approach taken both in American states and in the interna-
tional context. Interestingly, many of the Court’s education cases,
as law professor Kenji Yoshino notes, involve intertwined liberty and
equality claims.219 Thus, in this discussion of educational quality, it
is both ambitious and practical to revisit the discussion of education
as a focus of Substantive Due Process by explicitly engaging liberty
concerns.220
As law professor Susan Bitensky wrote in 1992, two of the Court’s
earliest cases involving schools, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,221 both based their reasoning in part on Substantive Due
Process liberty interests of parents’ ability to direct the education of
their children.222 The architecture of Substantive Due Process has
changed considerably since the Lochner era, but Pierce and Meyer re-
main good law, at least for the core liberty principles noted here.
Additionally, a key Substantive Due Process consideration is tradi-
tion, and the importance of education in states’ constitutions,
statutes, and common law, coupled with the federal law was “enor-
mous” in Bitensky’s estimation in 1992.223 It has only grown since
then.
If one accepts that Substantive Due Process is a sensible forum in
which to discuss education rights, the contours of a right still re-
main unclear. Perhaps the most commonly suggested option is that
the right would be to a minimum level of quality as discussed in the
Court’s four Equal Protection Clause cases mentioned above.224
That option is a solid one, and it would enable courts to draw from
state school finance litigation interpreting state constitutions’ rights
217. See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the
U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Educational Crisis, 86 NW. L. REV. 550,
551–54 (1992); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1392–94 (2000); Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, supra note 5, at 1003.
218. See Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915,
918–19, nn. 4–10 (collecting much of the scholarship in this area).
219. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 51, at 788–89.
220. See Bitensky, supra note 217, at 581–96 (discussing the substantive due process right
to schooling).
221. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
222. See Bitensky, supra note 217, at 580–81.
223. Id. at 586–96.
224. See, e.g., Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection, supra note
27, at 1378–1382.
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to education—although dollars are a part of these discussions, a
quality education analysis focuses first on outcomes and then backs
into the financial obligation by calculating the cost of providing the
opportunity to achieve those outcomes. In other words, the content
of the right would not change, although the right would be framed
as a positive right in the Substantive Due Process context rather
than a negative right in the Equal Protection context. However,
that is not the only option. A variation on this approach is to define
a right to education as equating with or including a right to literacy
(or, similarly, a right to numeracy).225
The literacy hook in the Highland Park, Michigan right to read
case in state court was created by necessity, and it laid the concep-
tual groundwork for a Substantive Due Process claim. Thus, on
September 13, 2016, the nation’s largest pro bono firm sued the
state of Michigan on behalf of five students in some of Detroit’s
lowest performing traditional public and charter schools.226 Many
things are noteworthy about this case, and perhaps most signifi-
cantly the case is filed in federal, not state, court. Although the
plaintiffs present a variety of claims, the case is based on the theory
that the state has violated the plaintiffs’ right to literacy.227 Of
course, the catch is that federal courts have not recognized a right
to literacy—at least not yet. It is far too early to know what the im-
pact of this case will be, but the potential is great. In a nutshell, the
case could reopen federal courts as a venue for litigating educa-
tional quality and, eventually, school funding.
Focusing on a right to literacy as a specific manifestation of a
right to education is appealing for several reasons. First, recogniz-
ing the importance of literacy is not new, narrow, or partisan. As
human rights scholar and law professor Lea Shaver noted in her
detailed argument that a robust right to read is part of interna-
tional human rights law, both Kofi Annan and Richard Nixon have
been among literacy’s many champions.228 Second, literacy has
both “thin” and “thick” aspects. A “thin” definition would conceive
of literacy as something an individual has if she or he can read, and
lacks if she or he cannot. However, a “thick” definition would focus
on a student’s proficiency compared to his or her grade level peers
with the understanding that what it takes to be literate grows as the
225. Indeed, the literacy approach was embraced by a lawsuit filed in federal court in
Michigan in fall 2016. Complaint, supra note 175, at 1.
226. Id. (noting Public Counsel as firm representing plaintiffs); see also PUB. COUNS.
http://www.publiccounsel.org/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017.
227. Complaint, supra note 175, at 1.
228. Lea Shaver, The Right to Read, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 3–4, 30 (2015).
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child grows.229 Third, focusing on literacy rather than on the broad
range of things that constitute educational quality is more manage-
able for courts. Fourth, as Yoshino suggested in 2011, a liberty focus
“can be a ground on which to create coalitions that embody
broader, more inclusive forms of ‘we’” and thus “it may be that indi-
viduals who are experiencing the most ‘equality fatigue’ are those
who embrace the liberty argument most eagerly.”230 An education
rights coalition is an example of such an alliance that might, in
Yoshino’s words, “beneficially cut across traditional ‘involuntary’
groups such as those based on race or sex.”231
2. Education and Equality: Rational Basis With Bite
A related approach would be to work within the confines of the
Equal Protection Clause and apply “rational basis with bite” based
on the unique importance of education.232 Courts may be more
comfortable with an Equal Protection Clause analysis than with
other approaches to education reform, and the rational basis test
appears politically neutral.233 On one hand, this approach has been
applied so far only in situations where group-based animus oper-
ated.234 On the other hand, the Court has applied it as recently as
2015 in Obergefell v. Hodges and multiple factors seem to animate the
application of the test.235
229. Id. at 25–26, 30–34.
230. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 51, at 794.
231. Id. at 794–95 n.330. Finally, yet another possibility is that rather than looking to state
school finance litigation for inspiration and focusing on funding specifically, a federal court
could ask whether the web of statutes regulating education in each state create a system in
which individual school districts can be successful in the goal of providing education at a
certain level of quality. This sort of approach would require a court (and, ultimately a legisla-
ture) to engage in profoundly wide-ranging, deep reform, and like the other approaches it
could be beneficial in Michigan. The likelihood of a court going down this path willingly,
however, seems profoundly low.
232. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1972)
(setting forth the argument that would lead to the coining of the term); see also Michael
Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 540 (2014) (using “rational basis
with teeth,” which is used interchangeably with “rational basis with bite”); Kenji Yoshino,
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 488 n.5 (1998) (“Legislation has also been struck down on rational
review, leading some commentators to believe that a fourth tier of review—the so called
‘rational basis with teeth’ standard—has been created.”) (internal citations omitted).
233. Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 224, at 285.
234. Robert S. Chang, Will LGBT Antidiscrimination Law Follow the Course of Race Discrimina-
tion Law?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2103, 2135 (2016).
235. 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
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So, what is this standard and when does it apply? In the words of
law professors Jane Bambauer and Toni Massaro, the rational basis
with bite cases are “the misfits of constitutional law” because they
“correct government conduct that implicates no recognized funda-
mental or specifically enumerated right, and deploys no judicially
recognized suspect classification.”236 Although there is not a
formula for determining when rational basis will bite, a 2015 piece
by commentator Raphael Holoszyc-Pimintiel analyzed all cases in
which the Court had applied this slightly-elevated form of review
and determined that it was used most often when the government
classification was based on an immutable characteristic or when the
government action burdened a significant right.237 This is good
news for education rights plaintiffs.238 Children’s access to educa-
tional quality is, especially for younger children, a function of
where their parents choose to live, not the result of something they
(children) can control. Therefore, to the extent the right is vested
in the child, residence is something beyond his or her control and
thus immutable.239
Immutability was important to the Court in Plyler v. Doe,240 which
focused on children’s immigration status as the product of their
parents’ choices. The key language stated, “Legislation imposing
special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circum-
stances beyond their control suggests a kind of ‘class or caste’
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abol-
ish.”241 The Plyler court also discussed the importance of children’s
interest in education in language that has been quoted often since:
Public education is not a “right” granted to individuals by the
Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
236. Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 224, at 282.
237. Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis
Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2072 (2015) (the other factors were history of discrimination,
political powerlessness, capacity to contribute to society, animus, federalism concerns, dis-
crimination of an unusual character, and inhibiting personal relationships); see also Pollvogt,
supra note 216, 780 (2014) (applying the “rational basis with bite” analysis to Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
238. See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 382–87 (1999) (summarizing the Court’s
eventual adoption of a “hybrid” rational basis test in education cases from Rodriguez in 1973
through Papasan in 1986).
239. See Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 237, at 2085 (defining immutability).
240. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
241. Id. at 217 n.14 (1982); see Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 237, at 2086; see also
Pollvogt, supra note 216, at 780–81 (explaining how Plyler examines certain classifications of
people as a concern).
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411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). But neither is it merely some govern-
mental “benefit” indistinguishable from other forms of social
welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in main-
taining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its
deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction. The
“American people have always regarded education and [the]
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance.”
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). We have recog-
nized “the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the
preservation of a democratic system of government,” Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring), and as the primary vehicle for transmitting “the
values on which our society rests.” Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 76 (1979). “[A]s . . . pointed out early in our history, . . .
some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to
participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.” Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). And these historic
“perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system have been confirmed by the observations of social
scientists.” Ambach v. Norwick, supra, at 77. In addition, educa-
tion provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead
economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum,
education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of
our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne
by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to
absorb the values and skills upon which our social order
rests.242
Based on this language, it would seem difficult to argue that ra-
tional basis should not bite in a case focused on an uneven and
partially rotten floor of educational quality.243
The question, too, remains what it means to apply rational basis
with bite.  Interestingly, that is not entirely clear. The state interest
might need to be important, not just legitimate (and educational
quality surely is). It could be that the government action would
have to significantly further (not just minimally further) the interest
and/or, it is possible that the government action must be necessary
242. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
243. But see Dan Soleimani, Note, Plyler in Peril: Why the Supreme Court’s Decision in Plyler v.
Doe Is at Risk of Being Reversed—and What Congress Should Do About It, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 195,
198–201, 206–208, 211–17 (2010) (arguing that “rational basis with bite” was wrongly applied
in Plyler).
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to achieve the government interest.244 It may also be that a court’s
focus is on the nexus between the government’s interest and its pol-
icy, without judicial speculation as to additional permissible
government purposes.245 Or, it could be some combination of these
various elements. But whatever rational basis with bite is, it is more
than a free pass for the government—and when considering the
state of public education in some parts of the country, any level of
serious judicial engagement with questions of educational quality is
a victory for students.
* * *
If a federal constitutional amendment by interpretation or fed-
eral legislation and agency enforcement raise the bar at all so that a
right to education is more than a mere access right, it will move
educational opportunity in a positive direction across the country.
Right now, children in a limited number of states may share Michi-
gan children’s position as victims of education federalism.
However, because of education policy changes that have occurred
nationwide since the Great Recession, the trend of state courts’ in-
creasing hostility to education reform litigation, and recent changes
at the highest levels of the federal government, the number of im-
pacted states seems likely to grow. If it does, the need for federal
legal protections will become increasingly acute nationwide.
CONCLUSION
Unlike many countries around the world, in the United States
there is no positive right to education in federal law.246 Such a right
exists only at the state level and it varies from one state to another.
Part of this variation occurs because similar language in state consti-
tutions has been interpreted as creating moderate to robust
education rights in one state and weak to nonexistent education
rights in another.247 The blame is not entirely at the feet of state
courts though—in a state with a failing level of educational quality,
all three branches of government are complicit. Michigan shows us
244. See, e.g., Ian Bartrum, The Ninth Circuit’s Treatment of Sexual Orientation: Defining “Ra-
tional Basis Review with Bite,” 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 142, 146 (2014) (analyzing a
Ninth Circuit opinion grappling with this question); see also Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Ra-
tional Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 784–85 (1987).
245. Gunther, supra note 232, at 48.
246. See Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 708–09 (2012)
(discussing the relationship of positive and negative rights).
247. See id. at 738–40, 738–40 nn.165–73 (detailing diverse interpretations of similar lan-
guage by various states).
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precisely what it looks like when the proverbial floor rots and chil-
dren fall through: in one small district, a native English speaker
without a learning disability matriculates to seventh grade while
reading only at first grade level and sometimes misspelling his or
her own name, and in a neighboring major district, the percentage
of eighth graders proficient in reading is in the single digits.248
Under the current model of education federalism, these glaring
gaps in educational quality are not the federal government’s prob-
lem, and in some ways the federal government’s hands are tied
when it comes to being part of the solution. This must change. The
model of dual federalism does not reflect the current reality of
many federal-state-local relationships, and it is sorely outdated in
the context of public education. The interest of having a popula-
tion across the country with at least a minimal level of education—
indeed, the interest in avoiding creating a permanent underclass
through our own public schools—is an interest all citizens and all
levels of government share. It is grounded in both liberty and
equality, and especially since the Great Recession, it is threatened.
The present reality of public education in Michigan shows us what
is likely to occur in a growing number of states unless at least one
branch of the federal government intervenes. Adopting a model of
cooperative federalism in education would enable us to avoid a dys-
topic future by establishing a federal floor of minimal educational
quality. The children of this country deserve no less.
248. See supra Section III.
